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RISK-UTILITY ANALYSIS AND THE 
LEARNED HAND FORMULA: A HAND THAT 
HELPS OR A HAND THAT HIDES? 
Barbara Ann White· 
Through the results of the crash tests[,] Ford knew that the 
Pinto's fuel tank and rear structure would expose consumers to [the 
risk of] serious injury or death in a 20 to 30 mile-per-hour collision. 
There was evidence that Ford could have corrected the hazardous 
design defects at minimal cost but decided to defer correction of the 
shortcomings by engaging in a cost-benefit analysis balancing human 
lives and limbs against corporate profits. Ford's institutional 
mentality was shown to be one of callous indifference to public 
safety. There was substantial evidence that Ford's conduct consti-
tuted 'conscious disregard' of the probability of injury to members of 
the consuming pUblic. 
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company (the Pinto case).1 
[T]he negligence formula proposed in Johnson v. AIS Ivarans 
Rederi 2 ••• requires 'balancing the usefulness to the ship of the dan-
gerous condition and the burden involved in curing it against the 
probability and severity of the harm it poses.' This formula echoes 
that of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing CO.3. 
.. [T]he formula is a valuable aid to clear thinking about the factors 
that are relevant to a judgment of negligence and about the 
relationship among those factors. 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. ladranska Slobodna 
Plovidba.4 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. B.A. 
Mathematics, Hunter College (1969); Ph.D. Economics, Cornell University (1980); J. D. State 
University of New York at Buffalo (1985). The author thanks Patricia Brito, University of 
Houston Law Center, Class of 1989 for her invaluable assistance during her tenure as my re-
search assistant and, Marianne Merritt, Class of 1990, and Marie McGowan, Class of 1991, for 
their diligence during the final preparation of the manuscript. I would particularly like to thank 
Peter Linzer, John Mixon, Laura Oren, and Irene Rosenberg for their extremely useful com-
ments at various stages of the article's development. The research for this article was supported 
by the University of Houston Research Initiation Program and the University of Houston 
Envirorunental Liability Program. 
1. 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981). See infra text accompanying 
notes 269-84. See in particular infra note 279. 
2. 613 F.2d 334, 348 (1st Cir. 1980). 
3. 159 F.2d 169,173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
4. 683 F.2d 1022, 1026 (7th Cir. 1982). 
78 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [32:1 
What precepts in negligence jurisprudence could spawn such diametrically 
opposed views as to the proper measure of negligent behavior? While the 
Plovidba court applauds weighing the risk of human injury against the cost of its 
circumvention as the arbiter of negligence standards, the Grimshaw court is ap-
palled by Ford Motor Company's use of the same criteria in its production deci-
sions. Though the balancing of costs against benefits in legal determinations has 
been widespread and growing in recent years, judicial inconsistencies indicate that 
the implications of such a trend are not fully understood. The recent incorporation 
of economic cost-benefit analysis by some courts to further develop the balancing 
approach has only served to increase the confusion and wariness about fostering 
such guidelines for social behavior.s 
This article's purpose is threefold. One is to demonstrate how the use of 
cost-benefit analysis necessarily imparts the moral and/or political values of the 
user into his or her decisions. While the cost-benefit technique is itself value-
neutral, its application, as will be shown, requires that some moral choice be made 
for the cost-benefit implementation. Though the very existence of an underlying 
value-choice is often obscured by scholars' and judges' presentations of 
"objective" cost-benefit conclusions (whether deliberately or naively so), the 
choices are in fact there and should be elucidated and discussed. The second goal 
of this article, therefore, is to shed sufficient light on the dimensions of using cost-
benefit reasoning so that the reader, whether or not in support of a partiCUlar 
application, can venture knowledgeably into a debate of the value choices attending 
any cost-benefit argument that might arise. 
The third purpose of this article is to demonstrate that, in fact, cost-benefit 
reasoning as an adjudicatory process is one that grows naturally out of legal 
jurisprudence and is not merely an intrusion by another social discipline.6 Because 
of the furor created by a particular brand of cost-benefit reasoning (primarily by the 
adherents of the Chicago School), cost-benefit analysis is often viewed as a callous 
derivative of economic theory insensitive to our notions of fairness and equity, 
rather than the tool it can be for facilitating existing legal doctrine and values. To 
assist in demonstrating that cost-benefit analysis can extend rather than supplant 
traditional legal standards, the second and third parts of this Article trace the 
evolution of negligence standards from the nineteenth-century "avoidable accident" 
approach to the modem method of balancing risks against benefits. As will be 
seen, the shift towards a balancing standard was a judicial response to 
inconsistencies created by the older "avoidable accident" approach. The courts 
have never, however, completely abandoned the "avoidable accident" standard and 
its powerful appeal to a sense of fairness. As a result, the "avoidable accident" 
standard intermittently reemerges to create conflict and confusion both in the court 
room and in the establishment of social guidelines for appropriate private sector 
behavior. 
5. See, e.g., Dobson v. Camden, 705 F.2d 759, 772 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(Higgenbotham, J., dissenting). 
6. Black's Law Dictionary's definition of "jurisprudence" echoes the very essence 
of cost-benefit reasoning. The definition reads in part as follows: 
[W]hen a new and doubtful case arises to which two different rules seem, when 
taken literally, to be equally applicable, it may be, and often is, the function of 
jurisprudence to consider the ultimate effect which would be produced if each 
rule were applied to an indefinite number of similar cases, and to choose that rule 
which when so applied, will produce the greatest advantage to the community. 
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The Article also includes an examination of two vehicles of cost-benefit 
analysis that have risen to the legal forefront in recent years: risk-utility analysis for 
product-design liability7 and Judge Learned Hand's Carroll Towing formula for 
determining negligence liability in general.s The courts clearly view them as 
simplifying the legal reasoning process while bringing into sharp relief the issues 
the courts wish to address.9 
Although Judge Hand developed the Carroll Towing formula in 1947, 
courts virtually ignored it for two decades and only sporadically turned to it in the 
third. 10 Recently, however, the Carroll Towing formula has experienced a 
renaissance with the appointment of Professor Richard A. Posner to the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals.ll Its application has reached beyond the boundaries of 
negligence liability to such novel areas as the degree of recklessness in 
governmental action for purposes of the eighth amendment, the sufficiency of 
probable cause for a warrantless search under the fourth amendment, and the 
sufficiency of evidence for granting preliminary injunctions by the federal district 
courts.12 One might suspect that such innovative applications of cost-benefit 
analysis are prescient. It would be surprising if the catalogue of legal issues 
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 767 (5th ed. 1979). 
7. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 435, 573 P.2d 443, 
457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239-40 (1978). 
8. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2dat 173. 
9. In a case in which it is not altogether clear whether or not the risk of injury 
exceeds the expectations of the ordinary consumer •.. the plaintiff will almost 
certainly seek to make out I-Js case for imposing liability on the manufacturer on 
the basis of a risk-utility balancing approach. Practically, it thus seems quite 
unnecessary to confuse juries with disjunctive instructions posing the vague 
standard of reasonable consumer expectations on the one hand against the more 
concrete elucidation of risk-utility factors on the other. 
Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty) to Strict 
Liability to Negligence, 33 V AND. L. REv. 593, 646-47 (1980). 
10. Although Carroll Towing was cited for other reasons in several cases, the 
Learned Hand formula was explicitly mentioned in only two cases: Rosenquist v. Isthmian S.S. 
Co., 205 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1953); and Andros Shipping Co. v. Panama Canal Co., 298 
F.2d 720, 725-26 (5th Cir. 1962). One U.S. appellate court case, however, used the formula 
during this decade: Burgess v. MN Tamano, 564 F.2d 964, 981 (lst Cir. 1977), cert. denied 
sub nom., Tamano v. United States, 435 U.S. 941 (1978). 
11. For examples of U.S. appellate court opinions, see Wright v. United States, 809 
F.2d 425,427 (7th Cir. 1987); Davis v. Consolidated Rail CoIp., 788 F.2d 1260, 1263-64 (7th 
Cir. 1986); Lawson Prods., Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1433-34 (7th Cir. 1986); 
American Hosp. Supply COIp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1985); 
Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986); 
General Foods CoIp. v. Valley Lea Dairies, Inc., 771 F.2d 1093, 1103 (7th Cir. 1985); 
Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1564 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Paducah Towing 
Co., 692 F.2d 412, 422 n.18 (6th Cir. 1982); Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 683 F.2d at 1026; 
Washington Post Co. v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Serv., 690 F.2d 252, 285 
n.32. (D.C. Cir. 1982); Evra CoIp. v. Swiss Bank COIp., 673 F.2d 951, 958 (7th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982); Lange v. Schultz, 627 F.2d 122, 129 (8th Cir. 1980); 
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. N.L.R.B., 624 F.2d 347, 349 (1st Cir. 1980); and 
Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 892 (1st Cir. 1979). 
12. See Lawson Prods., 782 F.2d at 1433-34 (injunctive relief); American Hosp. 
Supply Co., 780 F.2d at 593 (injunctive relief, see infra text accompanying notes 235-41); 
Duckworth, 780 F.2d at 652 (definition of cruel and unusual punishment, see infra text accom-
panying notes 210-19); Llaguno, 763 F.2d at 1564 (unreasonableness of warrantless search, see 
infra text accompanying notes 220-34); Washington Post Co., 690 F.2d at 285 n.32 (freedom of 
information act application); Evra Corp., 673 F.2d at 958 (consequential damages); Maine 
Yankee Atomic Power Co., 624 F.2d at 349 (classification of employees); and Andrus, 594 
F.2d at 892 (balancing of mineral and fishing interests). 
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touched by cost-benefit reasoning did not continue to expand in the future,13 The 
need to understand the ramifications of these legal approaches seems clear. 
As a result of the multi-faceted analysis, this Article contains several parts. 
Part I gives a brief overview of the development of negligence through the 
incorporation of economic analysis. It also highlights the current issues arising 
from the use of economic reasoning that form the basis of discussion in the major 
parts of the Article, that is, parts V, VI and VII. Parts II and III give a more 
detailed history of negligence standards showing the evolution from the avoidable 
accident approach to one of weighing and balancing. The purpose of these two 
sections is to show that cost-benefit reasoning is, in fact, organic legal doctrine and 
not the foreign construct of another discipline. These sections can easily by 
skipped by the reader without loss of continuity, if he or she is not interested in a 
historical perspective or wishes to leave it to another time. Part IV examines the 
two most prominent uses of legal cost-benefit analysis: the Learned Hand formula 
and risk-utility analysis. Part V discusses the philosophical underpinnings of cost-
benefit reasoning and delineates the demarcations between a balancing test and 
value choices. Parts VI and VII investigate the use of cost-benefit reasoning in the 
court room, scrutinizing each application to discover the underlying value-choices 
made in each case. These two sections discuss extensively the conflicts regarding 
the legal use of cost-benefit reasoning in an effort to unmuddy the waters of value-
choices and balancing tests. The Article closes in part VIII with the conclusions. 
I. FROM NEGLIGENCE TO ECONOMIC REASONING: AN 
OVERVIEW 
The early nineteenth century saw the development of negligence theory that 
expanded the doctrine of liability for harm to include those harms arising out of the 
failure of a party to take due care for others,14 This development encompassed a 
13. For examples of cost-benefit analysis in other non-traditional areas, see National 
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), remanded, 109 S. Ct. 
1384 (1989) (in deciding reasonableness of warrantless searches, courts must weigh need for 
search against risk that search will undermine the social order by unduly invading personal 
rights); Pruitt v. Allied Chern. Coxp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978 (E.D. Va. 1981) (tort law should 
maximize social utility; non-existance of individual rights to wildlife should not preclude a pol-
luter's liability for polluting them); and Magayanes v. Terrance, 542 F. Supp. 28, 29 (N.D. Ill. 
1982) (having all-metal interior in police van is not violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights 
law §1983 because utility outweighed risk). 
14. The conventional view of nineteenth century negligence law is that it displaced 
older rules of strict liability to accommodate the interests of emerging industries. This view is 
summarized by Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth·Century America: A 
Reinterpretation, 90 YALE LJ.I717, 1717-18 (1981): 
[T]he prevailing view of American tort history regards nineteenth-century tort 
doctrine as deliberately structured to accommodate the economic interests of 
emerging industry. According to this view, the courts jettisoned a potent pre-
nineteenth-century rule of strict liability in favor of a lax negligence standard, le-
niently applied that standard to entexprise defendants, administered a severe 
defense of contributory negligence, and placed strong controls on negligence law 
under the name of 'dUty.' 
The central thesis of Schwartz's article throughout, however, is to disprove the most extreme 
scholarly assertions of judicial economic subsidization of industrial growth and to shaxply criti-
cize the remaining positions in that vein. 
For an early contribution to this composite view, see Wigmore, Responsibility for 
Tortious Acts: Its History (pts. 1-3),7 HARv. L. REv. 315, 383, 441 (1894). Wigmore sees 
the law of responsibility for harmful results as a continuous development in Germanic law, 
without a break, for two thousand years. Id. at 315. He finds that the earlier rule was strict li-
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broader range of liability than existed previously. Historically, liability arose only 
from intentional hanns or from a limited category of hanns to which the courts 
assigned absolute liability without regard to any notions of fault. ls The new 
theories of negligence now added liability for accidental banns to the traditional 
ones, though not comprehensively. Adopting the philosophy that certain risks 
were inherent to living in society, the courts limited their application of negligence 
liability by utilizing the argument that some accidents were the result of 
unanticipated acts of nature or an unfortunate sequence of events. The standard for 
determining liability was whether the court found the accident to be "truly 
unavoidable." If the court made such a determination, then no liability would arise 
and the consequential banns lay where they fell.l6 
Complicating the growth of negligence liability, however, were industrial 
advances involving increasingly complex scenarios of hann. As a result, the 
prevailing negligence analyses were unable, given the technological complexities 
underlying any particular injury, to support determinations of liability-free acci-
dents. The presence of human design inherent in any mechanical event rendered it 
no longer logically possible to fmd (or perhaps, more accurately, unreasonable to 
describe) any accident as truly unavoidable.17 
ability: "[t]he doer of a deed was responsible whether he acted innocently or inadvertently, be-
cause he was the doer." [d. at 317. He concludes that'by the nineteenth century, three classes 
of cases had emerged: (1) acts done wilfully with reference to the harm; (2) acts done at peril 
with reference to the harm [strict liability]; (3) acts done negligently with reference to the harm. 
[d. at 455-56. For an argument that the law alternates between periods of emphasis on liability 
without fault and fault doctrines, rather than Wigmore's continuous movement toward fault, see 
Isaacs, Fault and Liability, Two Views of Legal Development, 31 HARV. L. REv. 954 (1918). 
Isaacs finds "that the history of tort law records lapses from the moral fault basis and returns to 
it, rather than a single movement in anyone direction." [d. at 966. 
For examples of modern scholars contributions to the conventional view of tort history, 
see L. FRIEDMAN, A HIsTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 409-27 (1973) ("Absolute liability might 
have strangled the economy altogether •.. [s]o ordinary caution became the standard."); M. 
HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860, at 85 (1977) (before 
1800, almost all injuries were classified as nuisances and came under strict liability standards; by 
the 1860's many injuries were considered under negligence analysis and this substantially re-
duced entrepreneurial liability); and Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 
VA. L. REv. 359, 365 (1951) (judges believed that the development of the American economy 
would be hindered by liability for consequences of pure accident and began to require fault). 
But see generally Schwartz, supra, for an argument that fault liability had been the general rule 
well before 1800. 
In addition to Schwartz, Posner, in A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 
(1972) also rejects the subsidization view, arguing in its stead that courts were choosing the eco-
nomically efficient results. Though ideologically at the opposite end of the spectrum from 
Horowitz and Friedman, Posner's conclusion is in effect not that distinguishable from the posi-
tions he writes against. If the courts chose to "subsidize" industry by developing negligent 
theories that liberated defendants from accident liability, and if the purpose was to promote (or at 
least not retard) economic growth, then the courts applied a cost-benefit analysis. Clearly, the 
courts valued the benefits of technological advance over the harms it created and chose an eco-
nomic direction. This, by definition, is a decision based on economic efficiency and therefore is 
consistent with Posner's view. It is imperative for the reader to note, however, that if this was 
the courts' choice, it was not the only economic efficient choice available, and certainly in the 
minds of many-including this author-not the most fair or just one to make. Certainly, the 
courts' direction in the second half of the nineteenth century reflects such sentiments in contrast 
to the direction in the first half. See infra text accompany notes 61-95. 
15. There was, in fact, prior to the nineteenth century, some limited development of 
liability for unintentional torts. See infra text accompanying notes 43-48. 
16. See infra text accompanying notes 49-72. 
17. "[A] perfect locomotive engine, properly equipped and properly run, will not or-
dinarily throw out sufficient sparks to destroy adjoining property." Judson v. Giant Powder 
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Nevertheless, the courts were unwilling to shift exclusively to theories of 
absolute liability, a course that would seem, at least intellectually, the inevitable 
outcome when the concept of unavoidable accidents ceased to be functional,18 As 
findings of "unavoidable accidents" became increasingly rare, the courts struggled 
to fashion another method to assign liability short of absolute liability. With 
growing frequency they turned to methods of weighing and balancing to serve this 
purpose. Beginning in the early twentieth century, judicial considerations implicitly 
compared the benefit of an activity with the risk to which it exposed society, or the 
degree of risk against the cost of forestalling the hann,19 Under this approach, 
when the benefit was perceived to outweigh the risk of hann or the risk was 
considered less than the cost to avoid it, the courts typically found that the costs of 
the risk should be borne by society and not by the risk initiator. In those instances 
no liability would be assigned.20 This balancing approach became more prevalent 
Co., 107 Cal. 549, 560, 40 P. 1021, 1023 (1895). Of course, using the ideal engine as the 
benchmark for detennining negligence was not universally held. See, e.g., Flinn v. N.Y. Cent. 
& H.R.R. Co., 142 N.Y. 11,36 N.B. 1046 (1894), in which the court of appeals reversed a 
judgment for plaintiff whose house was burned down by engine sparks. In this case, the court's 
position was at the other extreme: 
The defendant was operating its road under lawful authority, past the plaintiff's 
lot, upon its own land, and therefore it could not be made liable for the destruc-
tion of the house upon the adjoining lot except upon proof of negligence in the 
management or condition of its engines. . •• The law is well stated in an extract 
found in the brief of the plaintifrs counsel from Pierce on Railroads (page 433), 
as follows: 'The duty of the company to use reasonable care in order to avoid in-
jury resulting to others from the exercise of its powers requires it to avail itself to 
the best mechanical contrivances and inventions in known practical use which are 
effective in preventing the burning of private property by the escape of sparks 
and coals from its engines, and it is liable for injuries caused by its omission to 
use them. Its duty in this respect is limited to such contrivances as have been al-
ready tested and put in use, and it is not required to use every possible con-
trivance, although already patented and recol\1Illended in scientific discussions.' 
This house was a smaIl wooden structure, and it is quite apparent that its 
destruction by fire communicated by engines was inevitable at some time • 
• • • The defendant is not bound absolutely to keep the spark arresters upon its 
engines in perfect condition. It is in proof that they would sometimes break and 
get out of repair, and if the defendant, having a regular system of inspection, re-
paired them at the first opportunity, it cannot be said to have been negligent. 
[d. at 11-14,36 N.B. at 1046-49. 
18. See infra text accompanying notes 73-97. 
19. See infra text accompanying notes 123-43. 
20. The business of life is better carried forward by the use of dangerous ma-
chin~; hence the public good demands its use, although occasionally such use 
results in the loss of life or limb. It does so because the danger is insignificant, 
when weighed against the benefits resulting from the use of such machinery and 
for the same reason demands its reasonable, most effective, and unrestricted use, 
up to the point where the benefits resulting from such use no longer outweigh the 
danger to be anticipated from it. At that point the public good demands restric-
tions. 
Chicago, B & Q Ry. Co. v. Krayenbull, 65 Neb. 889, 903, 91 N.W. 880, 882 (1902). 
Roads must be built and traveled, and to hold that the public cannot open their 
highways until they are prepared to fence their roads with barriers strong enough 
to hold a team and wagon when coming in violent contact with them, the condi-
tion being the ordinary condition of the country, would be to put a burden upon 
the public that it could not bear. It would prohibit the building of new roads, and 
tend to the financial ruin of the counties undertaking to maintain the old ones. 
Leber v. King County, 69 Wash. 134, 137, 124 P. 397, 399 (1912). 
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as industrialization and scientific progress advanced and the courts felt a need to 
circwnscribe the extent of negligence liability .21 
Over the last two decades the courts have turned more specifically to the 
discipline of economics to ~de them in their determinations of negligence.22 In 
part, this can be explained bylthe similarities between the courts' own balancing 
deliberations and "cost-benefit" analysis - a decision-making tool economists 
. derived from the principles of economic efficiency.23 The courts' adaptation of the 
more formalistic approach of economics to decision-making is also in part due to 
the encouragement by a number of scholars, who observe that efficiency analysis 
is designed to maximize society'S welfare.24 Some scholars suggest, and the 
courts often appear to believe, that economic analysis can go even further and 
actually dictate policy choices.2S In the field of negligence theory, this perception 
has been translated into the belief that negligence liability can and should be 
assigned so as to maximize economic efficiency - the implication being that to do 
so will maximize society's well-being.26 
21. See infra text accompanying notes 144-60. 
22. See infra notes 242-58, 259-68, 2frl-3fJ1 and accompanying text for examples 
where the economic teclmique of cost-benefit analysis has specifically been applied to negligence 
law. Cost-benefit analysis is particularly prevalent in products liability cases; see Birnbaum, 
supra note 9, at 605, 617-18 (risk-utility used in design defect cases even before explicitly 
enunciated). Furthermore, cost-benefit analysis has spread to areas of the law where its applica-
tion is not immediately obvious. See Tribe's disapproving comments on its frequent use by the 
Supreme Court in settling Constitutional questions. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the 
Constitution through a Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L. J. ISS, 160-61 (1984). As 
noted by Caplan, Does good economics make good law? [sic], CALIF. LAw., May 1985 at 29: 
[T]he major tool of 'law and economics' is cost-benefit analysis, and it is applied 
in seemingly unlikely cases •••. [Advocates] also apply economic analysis to 
areas oflaw where, until recently. economic theory has been considered irrele-
vant: constitutional law, family law and election law, for example. 
23. For a definition of cost-benefit analysis and its relationship to efficiency, see, D. 
PEARCE, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 2 (2d ed. 1983). 
[Cost-benefit analysis] is a procedure for: 1) measuring the gains and losses to 
individuals, using money as the measuring rod of those social gains and losses; 
2) aggregating the money valuations of the gains and losses of individuals and 
expressing them as net social gains and losses. Given the definitions of 
'rationality' and 'society' we can therefore say that a rational social decision is 
one in which the benefits to society exceed the costs. 
See also R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAw AND EcoNOMICS 50-51 (1988): 
A potential Pareto improvement allows changes in which there are both gainers 
and losers, but require5(that the gainers gain more than the losers lose. If this 
condition is satisfied the gainers can, in principle, compensate the losers and still 
have a surplus left for themselves. Compensation does not actually have to be 
made, but it must be possible in principle for the change to be a potential Pareto 
improvement In essence, this is the teclmique of cost-benefit analysis. 
For discussions on the similarities of cost-benefit analysis and legal balancing, see Demsetz, 
When Does the Rule of Liability Matter? 11. LEGAL STIID. 13,28.(1972): 
[T]he law based its decisions on acceptable and appropriate precedents, but the 
acceptability of those precedents should not be confused with the morality of the 
interacting parties. A deeper analysis of these precedents may reveal that they 
generally make sense from the economic viewpoint of placing the liability on the 
party who can, at least cost, reduce the probability of a costly interaction 
happening . . .. If the courts are to ignore wealth, religion, family in decid 
ing ... conflicts, if persons before the court are to be treated with regard only to 
the cause of action and available proof, then, as a normative proposition, it is 
difficult to suggest any criterion for deciding liability other than placing it on the 
party able to avoid the costly interaction most easily. 
See also R. PosNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 22 (3d ed. 1986): 
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Since any ruling of law will constitute a precedent, the judge must consider the 
probable impact of alternative rulings on the future behavior of people engaged in 
activities that give rise to the kind of accident involved in the case before 
him • • •• The issue becomes what is a fair and just result for a class of 
activities, and it cannot be sensibly resolved without consideration of the impact 
of alternative rulings on the frequency of accidents and the cost of accident 
precautions. The legal and economic approaches are not so divergent after all. 
The Supreme Court's de facto use of cost-benefit analysis without explicit reference to the term 
can be seen in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928): • 
[1Jhe state was under the necessity of making a choice between the preservation 
of one class of property and that of the other, wherever both existed in dangerous 
proximity ••• , When forced to such a choice the state does not exceed its con-
stitutional powers by deciding on the destruction of one class of property in order 
to save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the 
public. 
See also Cooley v. Public Service Co., 90 N.H. 460, 10 A.2d 673 (1940) (plaintiff suffered 
injuries while using home phone when an ungrounded power line broke, hit the telephone cable, 
and made a "terrifically" loud noise through the telephone. The court found that the suggested 
precaution devices would cause greater risk of electrocution to people passing on the street than 
to people using a telephone.). 
24. See, e.g., Bator, The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization, 47 AMER. 
ECON. REv. 22 (1957); Lachman, Knowing and Showing Economics and Law Book Review), 
93 YALE Ll. 1587 (1984) (reviewing M. PoLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND 
EcONOMICS (1986». Judge Posner has made one of the most explicit statements of the role for 
efficiency analysis in the courts: 
'Wealth maximization' as a guide to governmental includingjudiciaI action means 
that the goal of such action is to bring about the allocation of resources that makes 
the economic pie as large as possible, irrespective of the relative size of the slices. 
It means in other words using cost-benefit analysis as the criterion of social 
choice, where the costs and benefits are measured by the prices that the economic 
market places on them, or would place on them if the market could be made to 
work. 
Posner, Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decision-Making, 4 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 131, 
132 (1984). 
25. See Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis Of Entitlement Problems: A 
Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387,388 (1980) (emphasis added): 
What makes the efficiency or cost-benefit analysis attractive and interesting is that 
it appears to involve only one rather uncontroversial (or at least apolitical) value 
judgment: If a change in the legal regime helps those who gain by it more than it 
hurts those who lose, it is a good idea to put it into effect. • •• Insomuch as the 
goal of efficiency has been a factor in past choices to set rules one way or 
another, it will also be helpful in understanding the rationale of the rules in force. 
One form that this argument takes is to maintain that common law, whether knowingly or not, 
has tended to pursue the goal of economic efficiency. See, e.g., R. POsNER, supra note 22, at 
21 (emphasis added): 
Although few judicial opinions contain explicit references to economic concepts, 
often the true grounds of legal decision are concealed rather than illuminated by 
the characteristic rhetoric of opinions. . .• It would not be surprising to find that 
legal doctrines rest on inarticulate gropings toward efficiency •••• 
The efficiency theory of the common law is not that every common law doc-
trine and decision is efficient .•• , The theory is that the common law is best 
(not perfectly) explained as a system for maximizing the wealth of society. 
See also Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEx. L. REv. 757, 763-64 (1975) (logic 
of law is economics); Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 
J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977) (the tendency of the set of all legal rules to become dominated by 
rules achieving efficient rules is widespread); and Rubin, Predictability and the Economic 
Approach to Law: A Comment on Rizzo, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 334 (1980) (inefficient laws 
are more likely to be litigated and overturned). 
26. A number of commentators have used efficiency analysis to arrive at liability 
rules for assigning fault in tort cases. For example, G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF 
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 70 (1970), argues that assigning liability to 
the person who can best avoid it maximizes efficiency: 
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Contrary to these apparent beliefs, the use of economic efficiency analysis 
for determining negligence is not and cannot be dispositive of the fundamental 
policy question of who should bear the cost of an unintentional harm. Although 
economic efficiency analysis can give considerable assistance in ascertaining the 
behavior incentives the courts can foster by various liability rulings, the analysis 
does not provide ultimate policy choices.27 In the case of an accident, who should 
bear its cost is a policy decision that is analytically about equity and is severable 
from, without precluding, the separate issue of inducing efficient behavior.28 
Economic analysis is a reasoning process that explores how to bring stated 
priorities to a maximum while minimizing certain losses society wishes to avoid. 
To do so is, by the economist's definition, to be efficient. Though the process 
itself is value-neutral, it cannot be applied without some prior decision as to which 
values are to be maximized and which losse.s are to be minimized. Thus, though 
economic analysis does not inherently embody any particular ideological approach 
or social mores, its application necessarily requires that the user elect some value 
choice as the guiding principle. Furthermore, though economic reasoning can help 
discern often conflicting social values (for example, by determining possible 
candidates for bearing the risk of accidental harm), it cannot, by itself, choose 
from amongst them. Yet the fervor with which the legal community has grasped at 
economic theory to make "objective" decisions has helped to create the illusion that 
economics gives answers rather than merely guidance.29 
The tenacity with which the legal community has clung to the erroneous 
perception that economics dictates value choices spans the full spectrum of political 
philosophy from the conservative to the liberal, including the critical legal studies 
[I]f all activities reflect the accident costs they 'cause,' each individual will be 
able to choose for himself whether an activity is worth the accident costs it 
'causes.' The sum of these choices is, ex hypothesis, the best combination avail-
able and will detennine the degree to which accident-prone activities are engaged 
in •••• 
Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. I, 2-3 (1980), argues that strict 
liability yields more efficiency than fault doctrine because negligence looks only at the level of 
care required, not at the level of activity. 
Because an injurer must pay for losses whenever he is involved in an accident, he 
will be induced to consider the effect on accident losses of both his level of care 
and his revel of activity. His decisions will therefore be efficient Because 
drivers will be liable for losses sustained by pedestrians, they will decide not 
only to exercise due care in driving but also to drive only when the utility gained 
from it outweighs expected liability payments to pedestrians. 
(emphasis in original). 
27. See Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1272-
73 (1985) (although cost-benefit analysis purports to be neutral, it depends on social context for 
definition of costs and benefits); Vandall, Judge Posner's Negligence-Efficiency Theory: A 
Critique, 35 EMORY LJ. 383,384-86 (1986) (value judgments are inherent in cost-benefit 
analysis); Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1057, 1075-77 (1975) (despite economic 
dress, cost-benefit analysis is a choice between conflicting rights based on assumptions about 
duty); White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72 IOWA L. REv. 577 
(1987) (the decision to use economic reasoning involves certain policy choices). 
28. See infra text accompanying notes 259-68. 
29. The search for a basis upon which to assign the cost of injury is reflected in 
nineteenth century cases such as Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442 (1873) where the court, criti-
cizing English decisions that focused solely on the harm to plaintiff, stated that the English view 
"disregards the question whether, by transferring the hardship to the other party, anything more 
will be done than substitute one suffering party for another; and does not consider what legal 
reason can be given for relieving the party who has suffered, by making another suffer,the ex-
pense of his relief." [d. at 446. 
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perspective. The typical view is that economic efficiency is a .moral choice 
competing with more traditional manifestations of equity and fairness. This belief 
is evident not only among conservative advocates of economic determinism, such 
as Richard Posner,30 and "liberal" law and economics philosophers,31 such as 
Guido Calabresi,32 who urge that efficiency be weighed against other 
considerations, but the misperception also underlies criticisms of the law and 
economics approach offered by scholars from the left such as Mark Kelman33 and 
Duncan Kennedy,34 as well as scholars from the right, such as Richard Epstein.3S 
There are several dangers in failing to recognize the inherent necessity of 
making value choices in applying economic reasoning. Since economic analysis 
usually involves consideration of several complex factors, the implicit value 
judgments contained in the analysis may not be apparent. If the court believes that 
economic reasoning is value-free and its application must lead to objective results, 
the court may inadvertently promote certain policies it does not intend. In the areas 
of the law where the courts have embra~ed economic reasoning to assist in their 
30. "[MJy argument is not that wealth maximization is the only social value that gov-
enunent ought to pay attention to, but that it is the only such value (at least, if all other social 
values can be grouped under the distributional rubric) that courts can do much to promote." 
Posner, Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decision-Making, 4 INT'LREv. L. & EeoN. 131, 
133 (1984) (emphasis in original). 
31. So named by Duncan Kennedy, see Kennedy, supra note 25, at 387 n.1. 
32. [W]e would not presume collectively and objectively to value the cost of a 
rape to the victim against the benefit to the rapist even if economic efficiency is 
our sole motive. Indeed when we approach bodily integrity we are getting close 
to areas where we do not let the entitlement be sold at all and where economic ef-
ficiency enters in, if at all, in a more complex way. 
Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1125-26 (1972). 
Our reaction to accidents is not a strict dollars-and-cents one. If it were, I doubt 
that we would accept railroad crossing accidents because it costs too much to 
eliminate grade crossings[,1 and yet spend 'whatever it takes' to save a known 
individual trapped in a coal mine. An economically optimal system of reducing 
accident costs ••• might be totally or partially unacceptable because it strikes us 
as unfair, and no amount of discussion of the efficiency of the system would do 
much to save it. Justice must ultimately have its due. 
G. CALABRESI, supra note 26, at 25-26. • 
33. Neo-classical economists feign an apolitical value neutrality: they pUIport 
simply to explain how people can best attain any set of values. But the disci-
pline's basic building block method ••• is anything but apolitical. It is a method 
that could only be invented and adhered to by apologists, those whose interest 
was in reassuring us all of the beneficence of whatever order happens to emerge 
from the interplay of market forces, regardless of the nature of the society in 
which that market functions. 
Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 WIS. L. REv. 769, 796-97 (1979) (emphasis in 
original). 
34. If we wish to use economic analysis to generate a determinate ideal of 
private law regime, we have to make a series of value judgments that are more 
controversial, because more overtly political, than that involved in saying we 
should make changes whose benefits to the gainers exceed the costs to the losers. 
Kennedy, supra note 25, at 388. 
35. Even if they cannot provide satisfactory answers to fairness questions, 
the advocates of economic analysis in the law still insist that their work is of pri-
mary importance because it reduces the area in which fairness arguments must be 
judged in order to reach a decision in a particular case. But once it is admitted 
that there are questions of fairness as between the parties that are not answerable 
in economic terms, the exact role of economic argument in the solution.of legal 
question becomes impossible to determine. 
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL SWD. 151, 152 (1973). 
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detenninations, failing to acknowledge the true values underlying the analysis can 
lead to inconsistent rulings when the court is faced with similar circumstances in 
slightly different fonn.36 Furthennore, without a clear statement of the values 
underlying the analysis, a court facile in applying economic reasoning may change 
precedent or subvert legislative intent while appearing to be merely applying an 
"objective science" ·to reach an "objective" conclusion.37 Finally, by not 
recognizing the separation between the value choices and the reasoning process, 
individuals disaffected by results dictated by particular value choices underlying a 
given economic analysis may choose to reject economic analysis as a whole rather 
than the value choice with which they disagree.38 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF NEGLIGENCE THEORY 
During the course of the nineteenth century, courts grappled with a myriad 
of harms that arose out of the increased complexity of commercial and social 
interaction.39 Developing sophistication in transportation and communications 
brought a greater number of people together in an unprecedented fashion.40 Along 
with the growing bustle of social and economic activity, a vast array of new and 
novel unintentional injuries occurred forcing the courts to address the two-pronged 
question of what levels of risk society should tolerate and who should bear their 
costs when banns actually OCCurred.41 The negligence theories that emerged were 
an outgrowth'ofthe courts' struggle with those issues.42 
The nineteenth century negligence doctrines served to both expand and 
contract liability for unintentional harms over what existed previously. 
36. See, e.g., the contradictory results in manufacturer's design defects analysis in 
the Grimshaw case, infra notes 269-86 and accompanying text. 
37. See, for example, Llaguno, 763 F.2d at 1560 (for further discussion see infra 
text accompanying notes 220-34), and J adranska Slobodna Plovidba, 683 F.2d at 1022 (for 
further discussion see, infra text accompanying notes 259-68, 287-307). 
38. In effect, that is the conclusion that both Duncan Kennedy and Richard Epstein 
reach. Disaffected by the value choices implicit in the traditional legal applications of law and 
economics that they examine, they each seize on the "inherent indeterminacy" of economics for 
making moral choices for the P1lIpOses of attack. Instead of recognizing that the indeterminacy 
of economic reasoning is what liberates it as a tool for all political perspectives, Kennedy and 
Epstein choose instead to reject the reasoning process rather than value choices they do not 
share. See, e.g., Kennedy, The Role oflAw in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of 
Commodities, 34 AM. U.L. REv. 939,962-63 (1985); Kennedy, supra note 25, at 419-21; 
Epstein, The Risks of Risk /Utility, 48 OIllO ST. LJ. 469 (1987). 
39. C. DEGLER, THE AGE OF THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION, 1876-1900 (2d ed. 
1977); R. HIGGS, THE TRANFoRMATION OF TIlE AMERICAN ECONOMY, 1865-1914 (1977); 
E. KIRKLAND, INDUSTRY COMES OF AGE (1961). 
40. M. HOROWITZ, supra note 14, at 88-89 (courts were forced to develop negli-
gence theory because of an increase in collision accidents between strangers). 
41. Every legal system tries to redress harm done by one person to another. 
The industrial revolution added an appalling increase in dinIension. Its machines 
produced injuries as well as profits and products. . .. The dilemma was first 
posed in railroad cases, and continued to be posed most often and most strikingly 
in this industry. Almost every leading case in tort law was connected, mediately 
or inImediately, with this new and dreadful presence. 
L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 410. 
42. "Changing times and the amazing growth of our industries, together with a grad-
ual shift in the basis of political power, are factors which affect the direction of judicial think-
ing." Gregory, supra note 14, at 382. "[Negligence] provided a workable standard for the nu-
merous inadvertent injuries involving strangers, which had come to be characteristic of late 
nineteenth-century tort action." G. WHITE, TORT LAw IN AMERICA 18 (1980). 
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Traditionally, unintentional harms that were considered actionable43 were dealt 
with either by actions on trespass or by actions "on the case." The fonner (and 
older) action was one of absolute liability.44 Defendant was held fully accountable 
for injuries resulting from a trespass, which required a direct act by defendant to 
plaintiff. For example, if, while working in a hay loft, defendant dropped his 
pitchfork and hit plaintiff below, defendant would be held absolutely liable for all 
resulting injuries In an action on trespass.4S 
On the other hand, if plaintiff stumbled onto the pit~hfork after it came to 
rest on the ground, any injuries ensuing were viewed as an indirect result of the 
defendant's activities and were therefore considered "consequential" harms.46 In 
that instance, plaintiff could seek recovery only in an action on the case and only if 
he could show some fault on defendant's part. 47 Thus, whether or not the plaintiff 
was required to demonstrate fault on defendant's part in order to collect 
compensation depended on whether the courts viewed the harm as consequential 
or the result of a direct action.48 
This dichotomy in treatment of unintentional hanns was repudiated in what 
is now viewed as a landmark decision, Brown v. Kendall.49 Writing on behalf of 
43. Even the old strict liability rules did not afford relief for all unintentional wrongs. 
For example. by the sixteenth century, a master was not liable for the wrongs of his servants 
unless he had commanded the particular deed or he had consented to the deed either before or 
after the servant's actions. Wigmore, supra note 14, at 383-92. As commercial activity required 
that contractors and agents assume more responsibility, the rule of the particular authority 
yielded to a rule of liability for a broader range of actions by this special class of servants, under 
the rule of implied command. Id. at 392-99. Similarly, one did not have liability for the acts of 
one's animals unless one had knowledge of the animal's dangerous nature. [d. at 327-28. 
Finally, while trespass to land was traditionally a strict liability offense, it did not cover cases 
where the damage was from percussive effects of blasting. See Exner v. Sherman Power 
Const. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1931) (discussion of old rule of trespass). 
44. Gregory, supra note 14, at 361-64. 
45. Now, the law is well established, on the one hand, that, whenever the 
injury done results from the immediate force of the defendant himself, whether 
intentionally or not, the plaintiff may bring an action of trespass; on the other, 
that if the act be that of the servant, and be negligent, not wilful, case is the only 
remedy against the master. • •• Trespass will not lie against him; case will, in 
effect, for employing a careless servant •••• 
Sharrod v. London & North Western Ry. Co., 4 Ex. 581, 585 (1849), reprinted in THE 
EXCHEQUER REPoRTS 580, 584 (J. Hare & H. Wallace eds. 1851). 
46. See Cole v. Fisher, 11 Mass. 136, 137 (1814) (question of whether correct ac-
tion is trespass or case depends on whether injury is direct or accidental). 
47. Gregory, supra note 14, at 361-64. But see Wigmore, supra note 14, at 442-43. 
The evidence seems certain that the rationalization towards the line of present 
standards [fault required for trespass] began at a much earlier period than has 
been supposed. In other words, there has never been a time, in English law, 
since (say) the early 1500s, when the defendant in an action for [personal] 
Trespass was not allowed to appeal to some standard of blame or fault in addition 
to and beyond the mere question of his act having been voluntary •••• (citations 
omitted). 
48. Gregory, supra note 14, at 364. 
49. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850). According to Gregory, Chief Justice Shaw 
should receive most of the credit for the establishment of a consistent theory of liability for unin-
tentionally caused harm by his decision in this case; Gregorj asserts that the case quickly became 
a landmark decision. Gregory, supra note 14, at 365-67. Commentators who agree with 
Gregory include Roberts, Negligence: Blackstone to Shaw to ? An Intellectual Escapade in a 
Tory Vein, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 191, 192 (1965); and G. WHITE, supra note 42, at 14-17. 
Federal cases citing Kendall for the proposition that negligence is necessary to tort action include 
Exner, 54 F.2d at 514, and McGettigan v. Nat'l Bank of Washington, 320 F.2d 703, 705 n.3 
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the court, Chief Justice Shaw acknowledged the precedent to treat injuries 
resulting from direct action as actions of trespass, as distinct from consequential 
injuries which were considered in actions on the case.so However, he dismissed 
as dicta the conclusion that just because the harm is the result of a direct action, that 
liability for the hann automatically arises without consideration of whether it was 
"willful, intentional, or careiess."51 By so delimiting the necessary mens rea for 
liability and by including carelessness as one of the alternatives, Justice Shaw 
eliminated the absolute liability effect that had made the distinction between actions 
on trespass and actions on the case meaningful. He also established, in the 
opinion, what the standard should be for detennining "ordinary care": 
In using this term, ordinary care, it may be proper to state, that 
what constitutes ordinary care will vary with the circumstances of 
cases. In general, it means that kind and degree of care, which 
prudent and cautious men would use, such as is required by the exi-
gency of the case, and such as is necessary to guard against probable 
danger.52 
To give an example of how the standard of care adjusts to the circum-
stances, Judge Shaw noted the difference in care a man must take in discharging a 
gun if he were in open fields as compared with being in an urban setting.53 Thus 
Judge Shaw established that the cautiousness of one's conduct in the context of his 
surroundings-and not the harm alone-will determine liability for the effects of 
his actions.54 
Justice Shaw's decision highlights the nineteenth century courts' efforts to 
create a more uniform standard for recovery for unintentional harms: for both 
trespass and actions on the case, the plaintiff was required to show that the de-
fendant was at fault before plaintiff could collect damages.55 His opinion also 
reflects the courts' desire not to expand absolute liability doctrines to accommodate 
the burgeoning array of accidents stemming from increased social and commercial 
mobility.56 Though several types of unintentional harms were still recoverable 
(D.C. Cir. 1963). But see M. HOROWTIZ, supra note 14, at 89-90 (an exaggerated significance 
is placed on Kendall because trespass already required negligence). 
50. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) at 295. 
51. [d. at 294-95 (emphasis added). 
52. [d. at 296. 
53. [d. 
54. The old writs in trespass did not allege, nor was it necessary to show, 
anything savoring of culpability. It was enough that a certain event had hap-
pened, and it was not even necessary that the act should be done intentionally, 
though innocently. An accidental blow was as good a cause of action as an 
intentional one. 
Col/ins, 53 N.H. at 445 (Doe, J., quoting Justice Holmes). 
55. See, e.g., Center v. Finney, 17 Barb. 94, 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 1852) (no liability 
when, through no fault of defendant's, horse became unmanageable and struck another's 
wagon); Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75,84-89 (1864) (foundation of liability same in trespass and 
case); and Bullock v. Babcock, 3 Wend. 391, 392-93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) (only if injury is 
not result of unavoidable accident will defendant be liable for striking another with an arrow). 
56. For example, the Iowa Supreme Court said: 
The mere fact they [railroads] so run [in close proximity to roads], although it 
may render the use of the highway less safe, does not of itself constitute negli-
gence upon the part of the railway company. Such increase of danger is neces-
sarily incident to, and attendant upon, this improved mode of transportation, (sic) 
All persons must accept the advantages of this mode of intercommunication with 
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under absolute liability,57 the move was towards a negligence theory limiting the 
recovery for many instances of harm which were of the type previously 
compensable by the absolute liability of trespass.58 
The legal approach to unintentional hann, however, consisted of more than 
just a decision to limit liability short of absolute liability. The courts also 
developed a philosophical basis for determining what constituted fault. 
Throughout the theory's development, the courts established other dimensions of 
negligence beyond taking due care. One was whether the accident was foreseeable: 
"It [is] a question ... whether [the] danger ... was not to be apprehended, and 
whether ... the defendant [was] not bound to inquire into the nature ... of the 
risk."59 A second was whether the defendant's actions were sufficiently causally 
related to the hann.60 Another was whether the defendant exercised the full extent 
of his expertise and skill.61 Courts also considered whether the defendant could 
have taken preventative measures before undertaking the particular course of action 
that led to the hann.& 
Underlying all the different inquiries for determining negligence was the 
fundamental question of whether in fact the accident was truly unavoidable. The 
inquiry into defendant's knowledge and actions was framed in a way to determine 
if the hann was really the result of a convolution of events rather than defendant's 
conscious deeds. So, for example, the court in Vincent v. Stinehour 63 states: 
[I]f a horse, upon a sudden surprise, run (sic) away with his rider, 
and runs against a man and hurts him, this is no battery. Where a 
person, in doing an act which it is his duty to perform, hurts another, 
he is not guilty of battery .... A soldier, in exercise, hurts his com-
panion-no recovery can be had against him. . .. If the act which 
occasioned the injury to the plaintiff was wholly unavoidable, and no 
the dangers and inconveniences which necessarily attend it. The price of 
progress cannot be withheld. 
Beatty v. The Central Iowa Ry. Co., 58 Iowa 242, 247-48, 12 N.W. 332, 334 (1882). 
57. For example, blasting that carried rocks or debris onto another's land (see Hay v. 
Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159, 161-62 (1849»; or interfering with the flow of water to another 
riparian owner's injury (see Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520, 523 (1866». 
58. For an example in which fonner strict liability regarding the master servant 
relationship and the spread of fire yields to the requirement for negligence, see the discussion of 
Snee v. Trice, 1 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 345, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 178 (1802) in M. HOROWITZ, supra 
note 14, at 92-93. 
59. Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co., 4 Rawle 8, 25 (pa. 1833). 
Accord Collins, 53 N.H. at 450. 
60. Crain v. Petrie, 6 Hill 522, 524 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1844) (damages must appear to 
be the legal and natural consequences arising from the tort); Finch v. Brown & Bartholomew, 13 
Wend. 601, 603 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835) (in negligent collision, boat owner is able to recover only 
for damage to boat and not for loss of earnings); and Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381, 382 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1822) (because man landing balloon in field naturally produced crowd of spectators, 
liable for damage). 
61. "[P]laintiffs charge the defendant with so negligently, unskillfully and carelessly 
managing his boat, that she run foul of the vessel .••• " Foot v. Wiswall, 14 Johns. 304, 306 
(N.Y. Sup. ct. 1817). See also Gerke v. California Steam Navigation Co., 9 Cal. 251 (1858); 
Presby v. Grand Truck Ry., 66 N.H. 615, 22 A. 554 (1891), for examples where the courts 
found defendants negligent for not adopting particular safety measures. 
62. "It will be worthy of inquiry ••• whether the construction of the body of the dam 
ought not to have immediately preceded the pennanent provision ••• for the accommodation of 
those who should prefer to use the bed of the river." Lehigh, 4 Rawle at 25. 
63. 7 Vt. 62 (1835). 
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degree of blame can be imputed to the defendant, the conduct of the 
defendant was not unlawful.64 
91 
Similarly, the court in Lehigh Bridge v. Lehigh Coal & Navig. C06S. de-
clared: 
The defendant had the ... right to erect the dam at the particular place 
.•• and if chargeable with no want of attention to its probable effect, 
is not answerable for consequences which it was impossible to 
foresee and prevent. Where a loss happens exclusively from an act of 
Providence, it will not be pretended that it ought to be borne by him 
whose superstructure was made the immediate instrument of it. 66 
And even in Brown v. Kendall,67 Justice Shaw writes: 
If, then, in doing this act, using due care and all proper precautions 
necessary to the exigency of the case, to avoid the hurt to others, in 
raising his stick ... , [the defendant] accidentally hit the plaintiff in 
his eye, and wounded him, this was the result of pure accident, or 
was involuntary and unavoidable, and therefore the action would not 
lie/a 
The dividing line between the unavoidable or inevitable accident and the 
negligent deed was drawn in each case based on the court's perception as to 
whether or not the situation causing harm was within defendant's control in some 
fashion. Consider, for example, the judicial treatment of harms to the property of 
others caused by a fIre spreading from a defendant's property. If the fIre's origins 
were from a lamp lit by a human being, the presumption was that the ultimate blaze 
was negligently caused; whereas if the initial spark came from lightning, it was 
treated as an act of nature with no liability attached.69 The courts viewed the 
spontaneous acts of animals,70 the natural consequences of acts of duty (such as 
military exercises),71 and situations of surprise (e.g., injuring another while 
jumping from a burning building or while carrying a third to safety)72 as being 
beyond defendant's control when no evidence existed that ordinary precautions or 
foresight or due care could have avoided the injury. These accidents were treated 
as inevitable and unavoidable, part and parcel of modern day society, and hence no 
action for recovery would lie. 
As nineteenth century technology progressed a contradiction developed 
between the desire to avoid absolute liability effects and the unavoidable accident 
analysis. An increasing number of accidents were the result of human interaction 
with more complicated and sophisticated human-designed mechanisms and 
64. [d. at 64-65 (the last sentence actually appears on page 64, but is quoted in this' 
fashion for expositional purposes). 
65. 4 Rawle 8 (pa. 1833). 
66. [d. at 24. 
67. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850). 
68. [d. at 297. 
69. ''The ground work of the common law principle seems to be, that some degree of 
negligence is imputable in every case of accidental fire produced by human means; and it is uni-
versally just that a loss shall be borne by him whose act contributed to it .•. It would be other-
wise, however if the fire were kindled by lightening .... " Lehigh, 4 Rawle at 25,24 (sentence 
order reversed for expositional purposes). 
70. Vincent,7 Vt at 65-66; Collins, 53 N.H. at 446-48. 
71. Collins, 53 N.H. at 444. 
72. Vincent,7 Vt at 65. 
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machinery.73 It became easier, with the advantage of hindsight, to perceive 
accidents as foreseeable since the accidents were less frequently the result of some 
surprise event of nature, such as a horse bolting loose. Ex post facto, the 
accidents increasingly seemed to be a logical extension of the design of the 
mechanism under question. As a result, the frequency of finding against the 
defendant in cases involving technological advances rose dramatically.74 Though 
the courts applied the prevailing negligence analysis, the effect approached 
absolute liability, since the fmdings were much more likely to favor the plaintiff.7S 
For example, Huntress v. Boston & Main R.R.,76 concerned plaintiff's 
decedent who died crossing the railroad track in front of an oncoming train. The 
evidence showed that there was a long unobstructed view of the tracks and that the 
train rang a warning bell upon approaching. Furthermore the court itself held that 
there was no negligence in the manner in which the engineer conducted the train in 
this circumstance.77 Nevertheless, the court upheld a verdict for the plaintiff on a 
negligence basis.78 The court reasoned that absent "evidence of insanity, 
intoxication, or suicidal purpose," the decedent must not have appreciated the risks 
he was taking. Therefore, even though the court found no negligence in the way 
that the engineer operated the train, the court felt that whether the railroad company 
was negligent in failing to foresee the plaintiff's poor appreciation of the risk and 
to take preventative measures was a question of fact for the jury. 79 
The degree to which the courts' tolerance of risk declined when confronting 
harm arising out of technological advances can be seen by comparing Huntress 
with earlier cases. The analysis and conclusion in Huntress contrasts significantly 
with that in Vincent v. Stinehour, which five decades earlier stated, "where a horse 
takes a sudden fright, and there is no imprudence in the rider, either in managing 
the horse or in driving an unsafe horse, and the horse runs against another, and 
injures him, the trespass is wholly involuntary and unavoidable, for which no 
action can be maintained.''BO The similarity of circumstances is striking save for 
the substitution of surprising behavior by a human being for that by a horse, yet 
the two cases yield quite different results. The Huntress analysis is also 
considerably less forgiving than that in Brown v. Collins, which claimed no 
liability would lie if "defendant had said that the plaintiff ran cross his piece [gun] 
when it was discharging ... .''81 Certainly the risk of one's horse bolting or of a 
bystander crossing one's line of fire is no less foreseeable, and probably a great 
deal more so, than an individual purposely crossing railroad tracks with an 
unobstructed view of an oncoming train ringing a warning bell. What elements of 
control must the courts have felt the railroad industry to have, in order to reach the 
73. The number of accidents involving railways and streetcars alone was a 
tremendous strain on the courts. In some cities, these claims occupied a third to a half of the 
time spent in jury trials. Ballantine, A Compensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims, 29 
HARV. L. REv. 705 (1916). 
74. See infra note 96. 
75. "The Courts expanded on the negligence standard in ways that rendered it 
ambitious and demanding, narrowing the gap between negligence and strict liability." Schwartz, 
supra note 14, at 1773, commenting on his findings from a detailed study of the application of 
negligence theory in the nineteenth century by the courts of California and New Hampshire. 
76. 66 N.H. 185, 34 A. 154 (1890). 
77. Huntress, 66 N.H. at 186, 34 A. at 155. 
78. [d. at 191-92, 34 A. at 157. 
79. [d. 
80. Vincent,7 Vt. at 66. 
81. Collins, 53 N.H. at 444. 
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conclusion under the traditional negligence standard, that the accident in Huntress 
was avoidable? ' 
As the power of design improved, so did the courts' perception of the 
power to prevent accidents. In Butcher v. Vaca Valley & Clear Lake RR.,82 the 
California Supreme Court decided that a presumption of negligence was raised by 
evidence that, theoretically, a railroad engine could be made that would not 
produce fIre-causing sparks. Therefore, the court found that the nillroad engine's 
production of sparks was, in fact,primaJacie proof of defendant's negligence.83 
The standard of due care also increased with the complexity of modem 
invention. In Giraudi v. Electric Imp. CO.,84 a restaurant employee went on the 
roof to repair a sign during a heavy thunderstorm. He inadvertently came in 
contact with a power line that he knew (but forgot) was there.85 The court upheld 
a jury verdict against the power company, stating that electricity was dangerous 
and that defendant had to take the utmost care to avoid injury ,86 a higher standard 
than "ordinary care.''87 In terms of acknowledging and accepting risks, the tum-
of-the-century courts' positions represented a shift from earlier courts such as the 
Collins court, which stated (with regard to the developments of modem society): 
TraffIc on the highways, whether by land or sea, cannot be 
conducted without exposing those whose persons or property are 
near it to some inevitable risk; and that being so, those who go on the 
highway, or have their property adjacent to it, may well be held to do 
so subject to their taking upon themselves the risk of injury from that 
inevitable danger; and persons who, by license of the owner, pass 
near warehouses where goods are being raised or lowered, certainly 
do so subject to the inevitable risk of accident.88 
The Collins court's analysis, which found "inevitable" the risk of harm from 
highways and the loading and unloading of warehouse cargo (both considered 
quite dangerous in those days) suggests that the courts should reach a similar 
82. 67 Cal. 518; 8 P. 174 (1885). 
83. [d. at 524, 8 P. at 178. But see Stringham v. Hilton, 111 N.Y. 188,195-96,18 
N.B. 870, 872 (1888) (employer entitled to use any machinery which is reasonably safe; not 
required to use safest alternative). 
84. 107 Cal. 120, 40 P. 108 (1895). 
85. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent The plain-
tiff was employed by the hotel and restaurant which occupied the building when the defendant 
initially installed the wires passing over the roof. [d. at 123, 40 P. at 109. He had been on the 
roof of the hotel only once before the accident and only for a short time. This was during the 
daytime and on that occasion, the wires were dead. [d. The court noted that there had been no 
reason for the plaintiff to take notice of them and no evidence to show that he did so. [d. 
86. The defendant's attorney argued that the trial court erred in allowing an expert 
witness to testify as to whether the defendant's placement of the wires was negligent and in in-
structing the jury that a lesser degree of care is demanded from one who is ignorant of the 
danger: [d. at 126-27,129,40 P. at 110-11. The court found that, because there was sufficient 
additional evidence to show defendant's negligence. the testimony of the expert witness caused 
no harm. [d. at 127, 40 P. at 110. It also upheld the judge's instruction. [d. at 129, 40 P. at 
111. 
87. [d. at 124,40 P. at 109. The court also felt the electric power company could 
have avoided the accident by hanging their power lines sufficiently high above the rooves so that 
people walking there would not come in contact with the wires. The court argued that this could 
have been done relatively inexpensively, an argument that foreshadows the cost-benefit approach 
to risky activities that was to be adopted later. [d. See infra text accompanying notes 119-40. 
88. Collins, 53 N.H. at 449. 
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conclusion for the facts in Huntress89 and Butcher.90 Analytically, one might 
expect the later courts also to conclude that people traversing near rail trans-
portation and electric power transmission do so subject to the risk. Presumably the 
earlier courts' decision to limit liability arose out of a desire to make available to 
society the benefits of the challenged activities.91 It would seem to follow then that 
the railroads and the power lines would receive similar treabnent9l But as Hunter 
and Butcher indicate, they did not 
The language of the courts' opinions demonstrates, moreover, that the 
disparity of treabnent was not due primarily to a perceived difference in the level of 
risk. Instead, it appears that courts assigned liability because they felt that it was 
within the enterprises' power to avoid the hann; that this power arose out of the 
fact that the implements or environments ofhann were initially of human design. 
This approach was a logical extension of the unavoidable accident analysis. 
Since the fundamental criterion for detennining negligence at that time was whether 
the accident could have been avoided,93 it only made sense for the courts to 
examine the defendant's knowledge and expertise to determine whether 
preventative measures were possible. The fact that the hanning agent was initially 
designed by the defendant made conception of preventative measures after the fact 
easy for the courts to perceive. For some reason, however, consideration of 
preventative measures was not adopted in the older cases to the same degree. For 
example, in Brown v. Kendal1 94 the defendant, knowing that the plaintiff was 
close by, could have turned around to see if the plaintiff was behind him before 
raising the stick to separate their fighting dogs. But Justice Shaw presumably 
decided that in the excitement of the moment, the defendant's failure to do so was 
not unexpected, or was at least human and therefore not negligent. One can 
89. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text. 
90. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. 
91. In Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873), the court considered the question of 
whether trespass to land, in this case from fragments of an exploding boiler, should be a abso-
lute liability offense. The court noted that some previous cases laid down the principle that any 
individual is entitled to undisturbed possession and enjoyment of his property. It retreated from 
this absolute liability position, saying "this principle ••• has many exceptions and limitations, 
made necessary by the exigencies of business and society ." [d. at 480. The Losee court based 
its decision on a need to enhance the general welfare: 
I hold my property subject to the risk that it may be unavoidably or accidentally 
injured by those who live near me; and as I move about upon the public high-
ways and in all places where other persons may lawfully be, I take the risk of 
being accidentally injured in my person by them without fault on their part. Most 
of the rights of property, as well as of person, in the social state, are not absolute 
but relative, and they must be so arranged and modified, not unnecessarily 
infringing upon natural rights, as upon the whole to promote the general welfare. 
[d. at 485. For a further discussion of Losee, see infra text accompanying notes 104-22. 
92. The court in Butcher, similar to Losee, declined to find absolute liability the rule. 
Butcher, 67 Cal. at 523-24, 8 P. at 177-78. "In the absence of statute, the rule is that inasmuch 
as railroad companies. authorized by charter to use stearn-power, have necessarily the right to 
use fire as a means of generating stearn, and are therefore not liable for fires unavoidably pro-
duced by keeping fue for such a purpose •••• " [d. at 523, 8 P. at 177 (emphasis in original). 
93. "Unavoidable accident" means an unintended occurrence which could not have 
been foreseen or prevented by the exercise of reasonable precautions. W. PROSSER & W. 
KEETON, THE LAw OF TORrS 162 (5th ed. 1984). The addition of the reasonability standard 
makes the basis for liability less clearcut and absolute. ''What was expected [under the nine-
teenth century liability standard] was not perfection, but the vague, subtle standard of the 
'reasonable man' •.•. The morals were those of the ordinary man, in an industrial world." L. 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 410. 
94. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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conclude that in the cases of the railroads, electric power and other more complex 
innovations, the courts were impressed by the power of human inventiveness, and 
as a result, reached further into the designs to find the power to avoid harm. 
The effort to discern possible preventative measures was at cross-purposes, 
however, with the other goal of the avoidable accident analysis, which was to 
avoid absolute liability.9S Even though the courts used the traditional negligence 
analysis to make their determinations, in the areas involving technological advance 
the consistency of rmding for the plaintiff created an atmosphere of absolute 
liability.96 This was a result the courts probably did not want to reach,97 but was 
one to which they must have felt inexorably led by the methods of determining 
negligence available at that time. . 
Faced with an intellectual conundrum, the courts gradually resolved the 
problem technology created by evolving a new theory of negligence, one which 
considered as a major factor the weighing of risks against benefits, costs against 
harms.98 By determining negligence decisions with a balancing test, the courts 
found a means to avoid absolute liability. Now the courts were no longer confined 
to assign liability on the basis of risk alone but could choose instead to assign 
liability on the basis of whether the risk of harm outweighed the benefits of the 
activity or product under scrutiny. Such balancing tests permitted the courts to 
limit the instances in which defendants would be held liable for harm. These 
balancing tests contained in essence the principles of cost-benefit reasoning.99 
Ill. THE UNFOLDING OF LEGAL COST-BENEFIT 
REASONING 
Most principles of tort liability appear to reflect widely diver-
gent policies; and they become modifi~d before our eyes as the exi-
95. See supra note 91. 
96. Schwartz found that in nineteeQth century cases heard by California appellate 
courts, there were two hundred forty-eight jury verdicts for plaintiffs and only twenty-six. for 
defendants. In suits against railroads in the same state, the breakdown is one hundred eleven to 
twelve. Similarly for New Hampshire, among appellate cases after 1850, there were one 
hundred forty-seven jury verdicts for the plaintiff and twenty-two for the defendant For the 
entire nineteenth century, there were seventy-one verdicts for the plaintiffs in railroad cases and 
nine for the defendants. The ratio for highway accident cases against towns was a similarly 
overwhelming ratio of forty-one to nine. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 1764. Richard Posner's 
survey of nineteenth century appellate opinions across the country indicates a ratio of ten to one 
jury verdicts for plaintiff against verdict for defendant Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. 
LEGAL SlUD. 29, 51 (1972). To test whether cases appealed may be a biased sample, Schwartz 
read all tort cases filed against railroad defendants in Los Angeles County between 1889 and 
1895. The ratio of decisions for plaintiffs against those for defendants was approximately two 
to one. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 1764. 
97. For example, the Losee court disavows absolute liability expressly: "It is suffi-
cient, however, to say, that the law, as laid in those [absolute liability] cases, is in direct conflict 
with the law as settled in this country." Losee, 51 N.Y. at 486-87. 
98. The necessity of balancing the risk against harm is apparent in a number of early 
cases. See, e.g., Card v. New York & Harlem R.R. Co., 50 Barb. 40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1864) 
(railroads "should exercise a degree of care and precaution proportioned to the impending danger 
and probabilities of a collision''); and Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 47 N.Y. 282, 288 
(1872) (where common carriers transport passengers and the result of an accident is almost 
certain to be fatal, they are bound to use every precaution human skill can provide); Schwartz 
has noted that "[t]he more substantial the New Hampshire and California Courts perceived the 
risks in the defendant's activity to be, the higher the level of care they required the defendant to 
exercise." Schwartz, supra note 14, at 1757. 
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gencies of changing times demand that they should serve new poIi-
cies.1°O 
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Two cases illustrate the courts' movement away from the limitations of 
actions in trespass to the burgeoning mode of weighing and balancing decision-
making. Losee v. Buchanan,IOI an 1873 New York intermediate appellate deci-
sion, is exemplary in that it displays the court's sweep from the absolute liability of 
direct trespass analysis to the nineteenth century negligence standard of the 
unavoidable accident approach. Yet embodied in the court's language justifying 
that transformation is the substance of cost-benefit reasoning, a harbinger of legal 
postures to come. Exemplifying the full flower of the balancing approach, five 
decades later, is Adams v. Bullock,ICYl a New York Court of Appeals decision by 
Judge Cardozo. The opinion, while echoing the language of the older unavoidable 
accident framework, depicts the court determining liability by weighing risks of 
harm against costs of avoiding injury stemming from the impact of technological 
fall-outlO3 
A. Losee v. Buchanan 
In Losee, an exploding boiler from the defendant's paper mill catapulted 
projectiles onto plaintiff's land, causing damage to his buildings and personal 
property.l04 The plaintiff claimed that the defendant was liable for the damages 
even though there was no allegation or evidence of lack of due care. The 
plaintiff's argument rested on the principles of trespass, which automatically in-
voked absolute liability. lOS The court's analysis in rejecting the plaintiff's position 
clearly demonstrates the desire to curtail the absolute liability standard. While 
acknowledging that trespass case law seemed in accord with the plaintiff's 
argument for absolute liability, the court distinguished the various cases and 
analogous principles by rmding that in fact those results were not inconsistent with 
a negligence standard. 
The court observed in each type of case the1plaintiff offered to support his 
position, that the damages were not only a direct'result of the action taken (a 
99. See infra text accompanying notes 123-42. 
100. Gregory, supra note 14, at 360. 
101. 51 N.Y. 476 (1873). 
102. 227 N.Y. 208, 125 N.E. 93 (1919). 
103. See infra text accompanying notes 123-42. 
104. Losee, 51 N.Y. at 476. In the original trial, the plaintiff sued both the company 
and Buchanan and Bullock, major stockholders of the company, as agents. Losee v. Saratoga 
Paper Co., 42 How. Pr. 385, 385 (1866). The judge held that the question of negligence was 
not a factor in such a trespass case. [d. at 396. Defendants appealed, and the appeals court 
, ordered a new trial on the question of negligence. [d. at 386, 396. At the second trial, a verdict 
was rendered against the company but in favor of Buchanan and Bullock. The plaintiffs moved 
for a new trial as to defendants Buchanan and Bullock; the motion was denied. Losee, 51 N.Y. 
at 477. The General Term of the Supreme Court agreed with the previous appellate court that 
negligence was necessary for liability. Nonetheless, it vacated the judgment for the defendants 
and ordered a new trial because of certain errors. Losee v. Buchanan, 61 Barb. 85, 121 (N.Y. 
App. Div.1871). The defendants then appealed; the New York Commission of Appeals found 
no error, reversed the intermediate appellate court, and affirmed the lower court judgment upon 
the verdict. Losee, 51 N.Y. at 493. 
105. The claim on the part of the plaintiff is, that the casting of the boiler upon 
his premises by the explosion was a direct trespass upon his right to the undis-
turbed possession and occupation of his premises, and that the defendants are 
liable just as they would have been for any other wrongful entry and trespass 
upon his premises. 
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requirement for an action on trespass), but the ensuing harms were inevitable 
outcomes of the activity, completely foreseeable and thereby implicating defen-
dant's fault.1OO The court contrasted the facts in these cases with those in Losee's 
complaint, in which the boiler explosion was purely accidental, unintended, and 
lead to unexpected results. Unless the plaintiff could demonstrate that the accident 
itself was the result of some negligence on defendant's part, the court asserted, no 
liability would lie. 
One English case in support of the plaintiff, Fletcher v. Rylands,lffl being 
squarely on point, was not distinguishable by the court's analysis. Fletcher upheld 
a broad basis for applying absolute liability, declaring that "the person who, for his 
own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to 
do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril."l~ Though acknowledging the 
English standard, the Losee court rejected this view outright, stating that the law in 
the United States was "that no one can be made liable for injuries to the person or 
property of another without some fault or negligence on his part."l09 The court 
justified the requirement of negligence with a cost-benefit styled reasoning, 
expressing concern for technological progress: 
By becoming a member of civilized society, I am compelled to 
give up many of my natural rights, but I receive more than a 
compensation from the surrender by every other man of the same 
rights, and the security, advantage and protection which the laws give 
me .... We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals and rail-
roads. They are demanded by the manifold wants of mankind, and 
lay at the basis of all our civilization. If I have any of these upon my 
lands, and they are not a nuisance and are not so managed as to 
become such, I am not responsible for any damage they accidentally 
and unavoidably do my neighbor. [My neighbor] receives his 
compensation for such damage by the general good, in which he 
shares, and the right which he has to place the same things upon his 
lands.1lO 
This paean to modern invention and the need for reciprocal tolerance of 
technological externalities foreshadows future courts' use of cost-benefit analysis 
for determining negligence. The Losee court weighed and balanced the results of 
holding persons liable against the need for societal progress to justify restrictions 
on liability assignments. The analysis, however, serves only to explain the refusal 
to adopt an absolute liability approach; it does not determine (as does the analysis 
Losee, 51 N.Y. at 479 (emphasis added). 
106. The plaintiff cited several previous cases to support an argument that the falling 
of the boiler on the plaintiff's land was a trespass upon his right of undisturbed possession and 
that defendants were liable even without negligence. The court distinguished these because, 
unlike blasting cases, the damage from the boiler was not a necessary consequence of the precise 
activity the defendant engaged in. [d. at 479-80. Similarly, the facts in Losee were 
distinguishable from cases involving continuing nuisances, in which owners of land on which 
certain machines were placed were liable to building owners on adjacent land who suffered 
damage from continuing vibration. [d. at 482. Likewise, the cases imposing strict liability for 
animals known to stray from the owners' premises or for wild animals did not control the result 
in cases involving inanimate objects. [d. at 482-83. 
107. L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), aft d, 3 L.R. - E&I 330 (1868). 
108. [d. at 279 (Blackburn, J.). 
109. Losee, 51 N.Y. at 491: 
110. [d. at 484-85. 
98 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [32:1 
by Judge Cardozo in Adams, below,111) the actual standard of negligence to be 
applied. 
In reviewing the lower court's instructions to the jury, the Losee court 
turned to the traditional unavoidable accident framework for guidelines in de-
tennining negligence. The jury's charge was to fmd no liability if the defendant 
acted with ordinary prudence and if the boiler's defects causing the explosion were 
imperceptible or undiscoverable upon examination.lIZ Since the instructions 
reflected the avoidable accident's requirement of foreseeability and lack of due care 
for liability, the Losee court found the jury charge to be consistent with the 1 
prevailing negligence principles.l13 
Since the court concurred with the jury's finding of an unavoidable accident, 
the case appears not to contain the contradictions inherent in applying avoidable 
accident analysis to mishaps stemming from advanced technology. However, this 
is not true. If the court had conformed to the negligence reasoning used in the later 
railroad cases,114 it would have found the defendant liable because the accident was 
indeed - by the railroad analyses - avoidable. us Even though the defendant 
presumably exercised due care in operating the boiler,116 negligence could have 
been found by the defendant's failure to consider precautionary measures in the 
event of an explosion, such as erecting barriers to prevent shards from escaping 
his property.ll7 Under the railroad analysis the accident was not truly unavoidable 
and the defendant would have been liable. 
As already noted,118 however, such a conclusion would imply that nearly all 
accidents involving modem invention would be found avoidable, since the very 
knowledge creating the new design appeared to contain the capacity to prevent the 
resulting harm. Acceptance of this view would have meant the adoption of a rule 
that had virtually the same effect as absolute liability. Because of its concern for 
modern technology the Losee court did not want an absolute liability 
environment.119 Thus, to avoid holding defendant liable the court was limited, at 
111. Adains, 227 N.Y. at 210, 125 N.B. at 93. See infra notes 123-42 and accompa-
nying text. 
112. Losee, 51 N.Y. at 492. 
113. [d. at 492-93. 
114. See supra text accompanying notes 76-83 and note 92. 
115. No accident, of course, is entirely inevitable, so long as it results from a 
voluntary human act. If the defendant rides a horse, which runs away with him 
and injures the plaintiff, the accident is not strictly inevitable, since the defendant 
intentionally rode the borse, and might have prevented all harm by keeping him in 
the bam. . 
W. PROSSER & W. KEEToN, supra note 93, at 162. 
116. Losee, 51 N.Y. at 492-93. 
117. At the trial, there was evidence that the boiler had been leaking a week or more 
before the explosion. The plant engineer reduced the steam pressure from 120 pounds to 110 
pounds. The leakage continued and the engineer of the paper company informed Bullard of the 
leakage. The engineer also told Bullard that he had reduced the pressure. There was no 
evidence that the engineer said it was prudent to run the boiler at 110 pounds. Nonetheless, the 
trial court judge instructed the jury that if Goddard told Bullard that it would be prudent to run 
the boiler at 110, and Bullard believed him, Bullard was not liable. Losee, 61 Barb. at 97-98. 
The Commission of Appeals found that, although certain charges should have been better 
explained, the entire charge to the jury must be considered as a whole and the judges charge did 
not constitute error. Losee, 51 N.Y. at 491-92. 
118. See supra notes 76-97 and accompanying text. 
119. Although this view represented a trend begun earlier in the century, see, e.g., 
Harvey v. Dunlop, _ Hill & Den. 193 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843), and the more celebrated Kendall, 
60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850), occasionally a court would balk at the prospect of the defendant 
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least at this stage of legal development, to using the language of traditional 
negligence theory and declaring the accident unavoidable. 
Losee demonstrates how the court shifted from absolute liability to negli-
gence. Though the court focused on the unforeseeability of the technological 
accidents as the distinguishing factor separating them from the absolute liability of 
traditional trespass case law, later COurtsl20 became more impressed with the power 
of modem design and perceived in it an inherent ability to forestall the incidence of 
injury. In the pre-technological world, unforeseeability and unavoidability were 
consistently intertwined .. With the advent of technological advance, however, the 
two characteristics were no longer simultaneous dimensions of any given accident 
Often, technological accidents that were not to be foreseen became preventable, 
with the benefit of hindsight, after they occurred. Consistent with their efforts to 
avoid absolute liability,121 the courts initially seized on the unforeseeability element 
to distinguish technological accidents to be deemed unavoidable.122 Eventually, 
however, the impressiveness of the power of design overwhelmed the 
persuasiveness of the unforeseeability of the accident, leaving the courts to fmd for 
the plaintiff with rapidly growing frequency. 
B. Adams v. Bullock 
Since most accidents stemming from human designed structures are in some 
sense preventable, legal consistency would require that the continued use of the 
avoidability criteria alone would lead either to all such accidents being declared 
avoidable or to all such accidents being declared unavoidable. If the courts chose 
not to go to such extremes in an effort to avoid holding all defendants liable or 
leaving all victims uncompensated, their decisions as to which accidents were 
avoidable would then necessarily become arbitrary. The avoidability criteria no 
longer served to make meaningful distinctions in the face of complex technological 
advances. 
This dilemma gave rise to the need for a new standard for determining 
negligence, perhaps one that could expand the avoidability principle. Once it 
became evident that the burgeoning number of accidents were avoidable in some 
fashion, the issue then arose: at what cost? Since the courts had already 
determined that to avoid the accident by not having the technology at all was too 
high a price,l23 the stage had been set to consider the costs of avoiding an accident 
as one factor in determining a duty to undertake them. In addition, some accidents 
appeared to be freakish occurrences (or at the very least exceedingly rare), while 
others appeared to be more of a minor inconvenience insufficient to warrant the 
efforts to avoid them. Weighing the costs of preventative measures, which were 
often large sums certain, against highly improbable or relatively harmless accidents 
seemed an appropriate basis for determining legal obligations to circumvent them. 
The effort to create such a new measure is evident in Adams v. Bullock.l24 The 
escaping liability for unintentional hann on the grounds of no legal fault and the court would re-
vert to a more strict liability approach; see Hay v. Cohoes, 2 N.Y. 159, 161 (1849) ("If he can-
not construct the work [on his land] without the adoption of such means [involving trespass], 
he must abandon that mode of using his property, or be held responsible for all damages re-
sulting therefrom."). 
120. See supra text accompanying notes 76-Frl. 
121. See supra text accompanying notes 49-72. 
122. See supra text accompanying notes 73.!67. 
123. See supra text at note 110. 
124. 227 N.Y. 208,125 N.E. 93 (1919). 
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Adams court, although still grounded in the language of traditional negligence, 
endeavored to articulate an expanded test for detennining negligence, one that 
augured the modern cost-benefit approach. 
InAdams, a tWelve year-old boy was injured when a wire, attached to a rod 
he was playfully swinging, accidentally touched defendant's electric trolley wires 
which had been strung several feet below the railroad bridge over which the boy 
was walking.l25 The court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff holding that the 
trolley company did not violate its duty to take all "reasonable precautions" to 
minimize the risk of accidents.J26 The court's discussion suggested ways the 
accident could have been avoided. One intimation was to post guards with 
sufficient intennittency to prevent passers-by from injuring themselves and another 
was to put the wires underground.J27 The first was not addressed and the second 
was dismissed on the ground that no evidence was offered to indicate either an 
ability or a duty on the part of the defendant to do SO.I28 The court concluded that 
"[t]o hold [the defendant] liable upon the facts exhibited in this record would be to 
charge it as an insurer."129 
On the surface, Judge Cardozo appears to analyze the problem presented in 
Adams with the traditional tools of the unavoidable accident approach of neg-
ligence. When he states "we think that ordinary caution did not involve fore-
thought of this extraordinary peril" he seems to be using the foreseeability element 
of the conventional unavoidable accident standard of negligence. Nonetheless, the 
language he uses is sufficiently flexible that it encompasses the implicit cost-benefit 
analysis with which he reinforces his conclusion of non-liability. So, for example, 
when Judge Cardozo discusses "the duty to adopt all reasonable precautions,"l30 
or notes the "extraordinary casualty, not fairly within the area of ordinary 
prevision,"131 his terminology invokes the traditional notion of foreseeability in 
tenns of an ordinary person's ability to foresee danger. The language and its 
juxtaposition, however, also signifies that whether a precaution is reasonable to 
undertake depends on its expense when weighed against the low ("extraordinary'') 
125. [d. at 209, 125 N.E. at 93. The defendant owned a trolley line that employed 
overhead wires. At one point, a railroad bridge crossed the road on which the trolley cars ran; 
the defendant's wire was strung beneath the bridge. Pedestrians often used the bridge as a 
short-cut across the road and children frequently played on it. The side of the bridge was pro· 
tected by a parapet about eighteen inches wide and the defendant's wire hung over four and one· 
half feet below the lOp of the parapet. Normally, no one standing on the bridge or even leaning 
over the parapet could lOuch the wire strung beneath it. [d. at 209-10, 125 N.E. at 93. The 
plaintiff, a boy twelve years old, came across the bridge swinging a wire about eight feet long. 
This wire came into contact with the trolley company's wire, and the boy was shocked and 
burned when the two wires came IOgether. [d. at 209, 125 N.E. at 93. The boy's guardian 
sued and the trial court entered a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Appellate Division af· 
firmed the trial court. The defendant appealed 10 the Court of Appeals. [d. at 208·09, 125 N.E. 
at 93. 
126. [d. at 210, 125 N.E. at 93. 
127. [d. at 211, 125 N.E. at 94. Cardozo also discussed the possibility of insulating 
the wires, which he noted was impossible, presumably for technological reasons. [d. 
128. Adams, 227 N.Y. at 211, 125 N.E. at 94. Compare this finding with that in 
Butcher, 67 Cal. at 518, 8 P. at 174, (see supra text accompanying notes 82-831 where the court 
found prima facia proof of negligence on the basis of the theoretical possibility of a spark-proof 
railway engine. 
129. Adams, 227 N.Y. at 211, 125 N.E. at 94. 
130. [d. at 210, 125 N.E. at 93. 
131. [d. 
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probability of an unexpected hann.132 This latter dimension is a precursor of the 
more modem day cost- benefit analysis133 and it becomes more explicit as the 
opinion proceeds. 
Even though Judge Cardozo concludes that the accident was not foresee-
able, which under traditional negligence theories should have brought the liability 
question to a close,l34 he nonetheless undertakes to bolster his conclusion of non-
liability by engaging in a balancing analysis. "Chance of harm, though remote, 
may be token negligence, if needless. Facility of protection may impose a duty to 
protect. "135 In effect, Judge Cardozo says that even if the hann has an extremely 
low probability of occurring, if the cost of avoiding it is equally small, there is a 
duty to avoid the harm anyway. This precisely foreshadows the Carroll Towing 
formulal36 and is a cost-benefit standard. 
In applying this test, Judge Cardozo notes that absent a "gift of prophecy" 
the company "could [not] have predicted the point upon the route where such an 
accident would occur."137 He concludes that "[g]uards here and there are of little 
value."I38 Imppcit in his analysis is a consideration of the costs of placing guards 
because, clearly, with a sufficient number of guards, the accident could have been 
avoided. But obviously, that expense would have exceeded his notion of "facility 
of protection."139 
Though Judge Cardozo must have felt it self-evident that placing a sufficient 
number of guards on duty to preclude the possibility of such harms would be too 
costly, he does not feel equally comfortable in making that blanket assumption 
with regard to the issue of placing the wires underground, perhaps because there is 
some question as to its expense and feasibility.l40 With respect to the guards, 
Cardozo is willing to dismiss the possibility without discussion but with regard to 
placing the wires underground he requires an evidentiary base.l41 Thus we 
observe Judge Cardozo making a determination of negligence not on the sole basis 
of whether the accident could have been avoided, but on the basis of weighing the 
risk ofhann against the alternative costs of avoiding il142 
Judge Cardozo's approach helps relieve the dilemma created by the courts' 
use of the avoidability criteria alone in the face of technological progress. The 
avoidability criteria is an absolute standard that does not permit the consideration 
132. Even the foreseeability element, as Justice Cardozo applies it, presages the cur-
rent approach to weighing benefits against harms. Foreseeability can be interpreted to mean 
something other than whether an accident is possible at all. Foreseeability can also mean 
whether the probability of a particular accident occurring is sufficiently high that it is "worth" 
(when weighed against the alternatives) guarding against Thus, Justice Cardozo's terms of 
"ordinary caution" and "extraordinary peril" tend to suggest this latter inteIpretation as well. 
133. See infra text accompanying notes 14M)(). 
134. See supra text accompanying notes 59 and 69'. 
135. Adams, 227 N.Y. at 211, 125 N.E. at 94. 
136. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text 
137. Adams, 227 N.Y. at 210,125 N.E. at 93. 
138. [d. at 211, 125 N.E. at 94. 
139. [d. . 
140. Cardozo notes, "Neither its [the trolley company's] power nor its duty to make 
the change [putting the wires underground] is shown. To hold it liable upon the facts exhibited 
in this record would be to charge it as an insurer." [d. 
141. Because the feasibility and expense of putting the wires underground was not 
established, Cardozo remanded the case for new trial. [d. 
142. For other analysis recognizing the implicit cost-benefit reasoning in Adams, see 
W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTIJRE OF TORT LAw 97-98 (1987). 
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of trade-offs between banns and the cost of avoiding them.143 Allowing for such 
weighing and balancing permits the court to determine which defendants should 
pay for accidental banns in a consistent manner. What is missing, however, is a 
scale to measure the pros and cons of a particular activity. Judge Cardozo does 
this implicitly by indicating that certain measures of precaution cost too much. His 
test does not, however, articulate a methodology to weigh and balance the 
variables of degree of harm, its probability of occurrence, and the cost of its 
avoidance. That refining process was left to the more modem courts. 
IV. MODERN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN THE COURTS 
Among the recent developments applying economic principles to legal is-
sues, two well-springs of legal theory have adopted the formality of cost-benefit 
reasoning for determining negligence. One is Learned Hand's Carroll Towingl44 
formula for determining defendant's duty to forbear risk, and the other is risk-
utility analysis for determining which risks inherent in manufacturers' designs 
should be deemed legally defective. Each body of law has developed in the 
context of the court's recognition that risk inevitably inures to the complications of 
modem commercial and scientific evolutions. In applying these frameworks, the 
question the courts seek to answer is whether a particular risk exceeds some social 
norm. As a result of the manner in which the courts apply both the Carroll Towing 
formula and risk-utility analysis, however, the answer in each case also becomes 
the answer to the subsidiary and sometimes obscured question of who is to bear 
the risks' costs when the harms do occur. Though these separate questions 
concerning the defInition of acceptable risks and the allocation of the costs of the 
inevitable harms do not have to be so intertwined, the manner in which the Carroll 
Towing formula and the risk-utility analysis incorporate cost-benefit reasoning into 
their liability determinations forces their cost-benefit analyses to serve both 
purposes. As will be seen later,14S this is not only an unnecessary outcome of 
utilizing cost-benefit reasoning, but it also may be counter-productive for the goals 
our society wishes to promote. 
Historically, the Carroll Towing formula and risk-utility analysis were each 
developed to defme a standard of negligence or liability in areas for which 
traditional analyses were either ambiguous or inadequate. In each instance, the 
courts sought to fmd a middle ground that neither left all victims uncompensated 
nor rendered all defendants insurers for every conceivable harm stemming from 
143. The imposition of the reasonable man standard does tend to soften the absolute 
nature of the unavoidable accident criterion. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58. Courts 
earlier than Adams attempted explicitly to do so. See Collins, 53 N.H. at 444: "There may be 
some ground to argue that 'utterly without his fault,' 'inevitable,' and 'no negligence,' in the 
sense intended in that case, meap no more than the modern phrase 'ordinary and reasonable care 
and prudence • • .... , The reasonable man standard, however, is vague and intuitive. 
Compare, for example, the different results courts have reached on the question of an indusbial-
ist's duty to use the safest technologically possible machinery. See supra text accompanying 
notes 82-87. Furthermore, it is unclear how the cost of avoidance should be weighed. See 
Sewall's Falls Bridge v. Fisk & Norcross, 23 N.H. 171, 178-79 (1851) (court ruled inadmis-
sible defendant's evidence that timber could not be taken to market, without costing more than its 
market value, in any manner other than the one they used). 
144. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173. 
145. See infra text accompanying 259-68. 
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their product or service.l46 In particular, risk-utility analysis - the more recent 
legal phenomenon - serves to resolve problems in negligence decisions caused by 
the difficulties of both manufacturers and consumers to accurately assess ex ante 
the risks in the products and services with which they deal. Each legal approach 
incorporates the weighing and balancing of harms against benefits and risks 
against costs of avoidance to make their liability determinations. Each approach 
also contains, however, an implicit value choice concerning who should bear the 
cost of risky harms and who should not. 
A. The Carroll Towing Formula 
In 1947 Judge Learned Hand in his now famous decision United States v. 
Carroll Towing CO.,147 explicitly posited a cost-benefit fonnula to deal with the 
problem of determining negligence in situations when traditional standards were of 
little use.l48 In Carroll Towing, an unattended barge broke loose from its 
moorings and caused damage.l49 One question facing the court was whether the 
lack of supervision was, by itself, detenninative of liability. While there was 
substantial case law assigning liability because of the failure of a bargee to be 
present, there were a significant number of cases which held that the attendant's 
absence also was insufficient grounds to support a judgment for the plaintiff.lSO 
146. A good description of the extremes of liability if defendant were made, in effect, 
an insurer is found in Wade, On The Nature Of Strict Tort Liability For Products, 44 MIss. L. 
J. 825, 828 (1973) [hereinafter Strict Tort Liability]: 
Thus, the manufacturer of a match would be liable for anything burned by a fire 
started by a match produced by him, an automobile manufacturer would be liable 
for all damages produced by the car, a gun maker would be liable to anyone shot 
by the gun, anyone cut by a knife could sue the maker, and a purchaser of food 
with high calories would have an action for his overweight condition and for an 
ensuing heart attack. 
147. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
148. [d. at 173. 
149. [d. at 170-71. The owner of the "Anna C" had chartered the barge to the 
Pennsylvania Railroad Company. The charter was at a stated charge per diem and included the 
services of a bargee between the hours of eight AM. and four P.M. The "Anna C" was moored as 
the innermost vessel of a tier of six barges at a particular pier, Pier 52. A tug boat, the "Carroll" 
began operations to "drill out" a barge at an adjacent pier about two o'clock in the afternoon. To 
do this, it had to release a line from the outermost barge in the tier at the next pier to a vessel in 
the tier at Pier 52. Before releasing this line, the captain of the "Carroll" asked the harbor master 
and a deckhand to make sure that the barges at Pier 52 were safely moored. The harbor master 
and the deckhand readjusted the lines to their satisfaction. Nonetheless, the tier of barges at Pier 
52 went adrift because the fasts from the "Anna C" to the pier were insufficient As the six ves-
sels, still tied together, drifted, the "Arina C" struck a tanker and the tanker's propeller broke a 
hole at or near the bottom on the vessel. The "Carroll" and another tug, the "Grace," carne to the 
aid of the flotilla. Had the crew on the tugs known the barge was leaking, they could have saved 
her. However, since no bargee was on board to notice the leak, the "Anna C" sank. [d. at 170-
71. The bargee who should have been on duty was absent [d. at 173. 
The court addressed the question of whether the "Anna C" owner's failure to maintain a 
bargee on duty should prevent his full recovery. [d. at 172-74. The court held that, under the 
circumstances, it was a fair requirement that the owner should have a bargee aboard during day-
light working hours. [d. at 174. 
150. [d. at 172-73. Prior case law was divided on the question of whether leaving the 
barge without a bargee on board was negligence. The factual circumstances of the previous 
cases were important in determining the results. For example, in one case leaving a barge made 
fast outside another barge with no one on board was negligence, in part because there was a 
storm warning at the time. In contrast, in another instance it was not negligence for the bargee to 
have left before a storm arose, because there was no reason to expect danger. In cases where a 
vessel was moored to another ship, negligence was generally fQund because the bargee could not 
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As Judge Hand noted, "there is no general rule to determine when the absence of a 
bargee or other attendant will make the owner of the barge liable for injuries to 
other vessels if she breaks away from her moorings. "ISI 
In an effort to derive a basis upon which liability could be assigned, Judge 
Hand indicated that there are some circumstances of runaway barges in which the 
owner will not be found negligent.IS2 Since the liability arising from an absent 
bargee was equivocal, Judge Hand sought to establish criteria for determining 
when an unattended barge was negligence and when it was not. Abstracting from 
the case law before him, Judge Hand concluded that liability depended on a variety 
of factors, as well as their varying degrees, and a determination should depend on 
the weighing and balancing of those variables.ls3 
Categorizing the range of factors into three basic types, Judge Learned Hand 
explicitly addressed the issue of weighing the costs of accident avoidance against 
the expected harm to determine the defendant's obligation: 
[t]he owner's duty .•• to provide against resulting injuries is a func-
tion of three variables: (1) The probability that she will break away; 
(2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of 
adequate precautions.lS4 
He then presented the appropriate relationship between the variables in the 
framework of a formula:' 
Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic 
terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; 
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., 
whether B < PL.1sS 
Thus, by a distillation of the previous case law, Judge Hand presented, in a 
formal fashion, the factors that should be considered in determining negligence and 
how to weigh and balance them in order to reach a decision. On one side of the 
scale is the risk of harm, calculated by the harm's severity adjusted for its 
probability of occurring, PL. Borrowing from the language of mathematicians, 
this calculation is often referred to as the "expected harm."IS6 Balanced against the 
anticipate when lhe stevedores might have to cast off lhe barge, and should have stayed aboard 
against lhat eventuality. 
151. [d. at 173. 
152. "[T]here are occasions when every vessel will break from her moorings •••• " 
[d. 
153. [d. Among lhe factors Hand weighed in concluding lhat it was negligence for lhe 
bargee to be gone during lhe working daylight hours were: lhe lenglh of time lhe bargee was 
gone (from five o'clock one afternoon until after two lhe next afternoon); lhe high level of activ-
ity (particularly during wartime); lhe foreseeability of lack of care given the "inevitable haste and 
bustle;" and lhe short January days. [d. at 173-74. 
154. [d. at 173. 
155. [d. 
156. Though "expected harm" also has a common parlance meaning, i.e., the harm 
one expects to happen, its malhematical meaning, lhough not inconsistent with every day use, 
has a more rigorous definition. Expected harm in a mathematical sense literally means lhe sever-
ity of the harm adjusted by its probability of occurring. Of course, since the definition is mathe-
matical, lhe concepts must be quantified. This quantification is reflected in Judge Hand's for-
mula. The severity of lhe harm. as measured by L, adjusted by its probability of occurring, as 
measured by P, appears in Hand's discussion as L mUltiplied by P, or algebraically, Lx P, 
which abbreviates to PL. PL, lhen, is the "expected harm." 
For example, if the damage caused by an escaping barge is $10,000 (i.e., L =$10,000) 
and lhe probability that it escapes is 50% (i.e., P =.50), lhen lhe "expected harm" of leaving the 
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"expected harm" on the other side of the scale, is the cost to avoid the harm, B. If 
the scale tilts towards the expected harm, then the cost to avoid the harm, B, is less 
than the expected hann, PL. According to Judge Hand's analysis, in such a case 
the defendant is obligated to undertake those precautions, and in failing to do so, 
should be held liable for any consequential harms. Under the circumstances in 
Carroll Towing, the court felt the probability of the barge causing damage was too 
great to justify the day and a half absence of the bargee. 
Carroll Towing is the analogue of the situation presented in Adams.lS7 The 
accident in Adams was preventable if a sufficient number of guards were posted 
along the trolley line.lS8 In Carroll, the barge's escape would not have occurred if 
there had been a twenty-four hour bargee on duty.lS9 As in Adams, the accident 
with the barge, evaluated by nineteenth century negligence principles, was 
avoidable. In Adams, the court did not articulate its obvious conclusion that the 
requisite number of guards to avoid such accidents was too expensive given the 
probability of the hann. It simply dismissed that possibility by only considering 
the ineffectiveness of a few guards, thereby concluding summarily - without any 
evidence or explicit balancing - that the defendant was under no duty to do 
more.l60 In Carroll Towing, however, the court is quite explicit that the de-
fendant's duty to do more is a.ffected by its cost, in particular, the cost relative to 
the degree of risk:. The court clearly indicates that a twenty-four hour bargee by 
barge unattended is PL, or in this case, .50 x $10,000 which equals $5000. If instead, the 
probability of escape was only 25%, then the "expected hann".would only be .25 x $10,000 = 
$2500. Thus, even though the actual damage - if the accident occurs - remains the same, a 
lower probability of its occurrence lowers the "expected hann." Obviously, in a similar fashion, 
differences in actual harms will also lead to differences in "expected hann." 
The purpose of the formula is to determine liability for damages, but not the damages 
themselves. If a defendant is found liable via the formula, then the defendant pays for the dam-
ages in full. The reason for adjusting the damages by the probability of occurrance is to avoid an 
absolute liability result. If the legal decision is to avoid absolute liability, then one way of mak-
ing liability distinctions is to base it on the likelihood of occurrence as well as the severity of the 
calamity. The "expected hann" captures that approach by allowing a trade-off between the 
strength of the likelihood and the degree of severity for determining liability. For example, a 
hann costing $1000 in damages with a 25% chance (i.e., one out of four times) of occurring will 
yield the same "expected harm" for determining liability as a hann costing $25,000 with only a 
1 % chance (1 time in a 100) of occurring. Thus, the Learned Hand formula will place the same 
legal duty on a defendant to avoid a hann whether it is of limited degree but likely to happen 
quite frequently (as in a nuisance), or if it is an extensive hann but extremely rare to occur. In 
this respect, the Learned Hand formula does seem to capture the essence of ''foreseeable hann." 
This framewoIk can be expanded to incoxporate more complicated and sophisticated sce-
narios. Suppose, for example, that the barge is left unattended so that the probability of escape 
and the level of damage depends on the possibility of a storm, and assume that storms are rare. 
Suppose there is a 10% probability of an escaping barge in non-stormy conditions and a 15% 
probability of an escaping barge in stormy conditions. If the damage is $2000 in non-stormy 
weather and $10,000 in stormy weather, then the expected hann of leaving the barge unattended 
is: 
P x L P x L 
.10 x $2000 + .15 x $10,000 = $1700 
Thus, the expected hann of leaving the barge unattended is the aggregate of the expected 
hann for each type of accident. Theoretically, when the court applies this formula, it can take 
into account all the possibilities of hann a particular activity might generate along with their re-
spective probabilities. However, some scholars view such theoretical applications to real world 
court room situations with skepticism; they believe that decisions based on such analyses creates 
more confusion than enlightenment. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 38, at 469. 
157. See supra text accompanying notes 123-42. 
158. ld. 
159. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173. 
160. Adams, 227 N.Y. at 211, 125 N.E. at 94. 
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itself was not a cost the owners were expected to incur. But the owners were 
expected to ensure that adequate supervision was available when the probability of 
harm was sufficiently large. . 
While deciding that the owners were not expected to incur the cost of a 
twenty-four hour bargee, the court simultaneously decided that as long as the 
supervision reached a legally sufficient level, the owner would not be liable for any 
damages that resulted from an unsupervised escaping barge. In other words, the 
court did more than use cost-benefit reasoning to determine what the social 
standards of due care oUght to be and whether defendant's conduct comported 
satisfactorily with them. It also decided that the defendant would not bear the costs 
for any harms that would eventually and inevitably ensue from its activities as long 
as, at any particular moment of time, the risk of occurrence was sufficiently small. 
Both the standard of appropriate risky conduct and the decision as to how to 
allocate harm's costs are crystallized in Learned Hand's formula. The question of 
judicial redress when defendant takes inappropriate social risks, however, should 
be a separate issue from whether and by whom victims of accidents should be 
compensated for their harms. 
B. Risk-Utility Analysis in Product Design 
Risk-utility analysis, though not presented with the same grandeur of a 
formula, nevertheless employs the same factors that Carroll Towing does, in a 
similar balancing fashion, to determine liability in the area of product design. 
Risk-utility analysis was developed to cope with the nature of harms arising out of 
the mass production and circulation of manufactured goods of sophisticated 
design.I61 Typically, there were two kinds of harms stemming from manufactured 
goods that seemed to thwart the purposes of more traditional negligence analysis: 
harms resulting from goods that were imperfectly manufactured and harms caused 
by the very nature of the product design. 
Harms resulting from imperfectly manufactured goods arose because 
something happened during production or distribution that prevented the product 
from taking the shape the manufacturer intended. An example is a loose bolt or a 
leaky valve or an exploding soda bottle.I62 Harms resulting from the nature of the 
product involved products that were as the manufacturer intended but that induced 
harms as a result of the design. Examples are knives that cut, airplane carburetors 
which are at some risk of icing and causing engine failure,163 and automobiles that 
can accidently kill people. 
161. For articles reviewing the issues with respect to risk-utility analysis, see 
Birnbaum, supra note 9; Epstein, supra note 38; Note, Adding a Risk/Utility Analysis to the 
Consumer Expectation Test in Design Defect Cases, 28 ARIZ. L. REv. 459 (1986); Twerski, 
From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations: Enhancing the Role of the Judicial Screening in 
Product Liability Litigation, 11 HOFS1RA L. REv. 861 (1983); Strict Tort Liability, supra note 
146; and Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 V AND. L. REV. 551 
(1980). The seminal opinion adopting the risk-utility approach is Barker v. Lull Engineering 
Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413,573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) (see infra text accompanying 
notes 242-58). Other interesting cases are Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 
110 (La. 1985), certified from, 755 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1985), aff d, 788 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 
1986), and Dart v. Wiebe Manufacturing, Inc., 147 Ariz. 242, 709 P.2d 876 (1985). 
162. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 
(1944). 
163. Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1977), rehearing 
denied with opinion, 282 Or. 411, 579 P.2d 1287 (1978). 
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The question facing the courts in both types of situations was whether the 
manufacturer should be held liable for the ensuing harms. The problem with the 
traditional approaches for assigning liability was that they required a demonstration 
of some negligent act on defendant's part. In those cases when individual items 
did not conform to production standards, this would entail showing that the 
accident of a loose screw in a particular unit was the result of a negligent action 
somewhere in defendant's production line at the time the unit was made. This 
burden seemed, to the courts, hopelessly impossible for the plaintiff to bear.164 
When some subtlety in the design itself caused the harm, both plaintiff and de-
fendant would frequently be unaware of the potential for injury until it actually 
occurred.165 When the defendant could not foresee the injury, a conclusion that he 
behaved negligently in the traditional sense was difficult to reach. 
The courts were reluctant to let manufacturers escape liability altogether 
merely because the traditional negligence analysis failed to enable plaintiffs to gain 
verdicts in their favor. Furthermore, there was a growing sentiment that even in 
instances when the defendants did not behave negligently by traditional standards, 
they should nevertheless pay for a substantial amount of the injuries that their 
product innovations introduced to the commercial mainstream. These views were 
fostered by several beliefs. One was that the manufacturers were in the best 
position to control and eliminate risks their products introduced into society. 
Requiring the manufacturers to pay for the consequences of those risks seemed to 
be the most effective way to create incentives for them to minimize those risks. 
Another reason was that manufacturers seemed better able than consumers to bear 
the costs of those risks. If forced to absorb the full consequences of randomly 
inflicted harm, the consumer may face [mancial peril. The product manufacturer 
can raise prices and spread the costs of those random injuries among all the 
consumers who benefit from the product. Thus, courts and scholars generally 
propose that enterprises should pay for the full costs of doing business.166 
The courts, however, did not want to achieve the goal of broader liability by 
returning to the early nineteenth century era of absolute liability. Though they 
wanted the manufacturers to bear responsibility for harms they brought about, the 
courts did not want liability to be applied for every conceivable harm. Once again, 
they were faced with creating a new standard that fell somewhere between existing 
standards. In this instance they sought a standard between negligence liability and 
absolute liability. illtimately, it was called strict liability.167 
The first efforts in this direction were to strip away the legal protections that 
barred plaintiffs' ability to hold manufacturers liable. In the famous case. of 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company,l68 Judge Cardozo removed the require-
ment of privity of contract that prevented the ultimate purchaser from suing the 
manufacturer in tort for harms arising out of the use of his product. Prior to this 
decision, the manufacturer was liable only to the immediate purchaser who was 
164. !d. 
165. E.g .• Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). 
166. [d. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701; Birnbaum, supra note 9, at 
596. 
167. See Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d 57,377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697. 
168. 217 N.Y. 382,111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
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usually a middle man and not the ultimate user.I69 The demise of the requirement 
of privity, however, did not alleviate the plaintiffs evidentiary problems of 
proving defendant's negligent behavior. A shift to suits in warranty was of some 
assistance,170 particularly after its privity requirement was dropped,171 since the 
focus of liability was on the merchantability of the product rather than the behavior 
of the manufacturer. Other requirements of warranty, such as proper notice, 
seriously impeded the unknowing consumer. Until the landmark decision 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,I72 substantial legal loopholes enabled 
manufacturers to avoid liability for harms the courts clearly wanted to impose. 
Greenman removed the obstacles stemming from traditional negligence and 
warranty law by asserting that manufacturers' liability was "not one governed by 
the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort."173 
Establishing a new standard for manufactured goods, the court said "[a] 
manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market ... 
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."174 What was not 
defined was the meaning of defective product, and the judicial struggle over what 
that standard should be is what ultimately led to the development of risk-utility 
analysis.I7S 
Initial efforts to define defective products also attempted to assure that strict 
liability did not extend as far as absolute liability, that is, that the manufacturer 
would not be liable for every conceivable harm that might stem from his product. 
Endeavoring tp create a standard that transcended traditional notions of negligence, 
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provided that strict liability 
applied to products in a "defective condition," that is, "a condition not 
contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to 
him."176 It went on to note that "[m]any products cannot possibly be made entirely 
safe for all consumption, and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk of 
harm, if only from overconsumption."177 Though it is clear the Restatement 
writers intended to draw some limits on manufacturers' liability, the qualifier of 
"unreasonably dangerous" seemed to beg the question of what constituted a legally 
defective product. 
Some interpretations compare the Restatement's definition to a common law 
attempt at defining defective products based on a "consumer expectations" test.178 
One definition of the consumer expectations test is that "a product is defective in 
design ... if the product has failed to perfonn as safely as an ordinary consumer 
would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner .••. "179 
Some of the difficulties with this standard arise because consumers often do not 
169. See, e.g., Huset v. J.1. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 865, 867-71 (8th 
Cir.1903). 
170. Birnbaum, supra note 9, at 594-96. 
171. E.g •• Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 
(1960). 
172. 59 Cal. 2d 57,377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). 
173. [d. at 63,377 P.2d at 901,27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. 
174. [d. at 62,377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. 
175. A number of recountings of that struggle, each with their own interpretations, can 
be found in the references cited in note 161. supra. 
176. REsTA1EMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment g (1965). 
177 • [d. comment i. 
178. E.g., Birnbaum, supra note 9, at 611. 
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know what to expect from a new and different product and thus consumer 
expectations would set a standard far lower than the courts intend.ISO Another 
objection is whether the consumer expectations test implicitly entails assumptions 
of risk and is therefore inconsistent with the spirit of strict liability, which seeks to 
be independent of either the consumer or the manufacturer's behavior.I81 
Considerable frustration with attempts to establish a standard that holds de-
fendants liable for a broader range of harm than traditional negligence principles 
and yet avoids an absolute liability effect, has caused some courts to turn to the 
risk-utility approach for solace. Recommended by Dean Wade in his classic ar-
ticle, On The Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products,l82 the risk-utility test 
classifies a design as legally defective when "the magnitude of the risk created by 
the dangerous condition of the product [is] outweighed by the social utility attained 
by putting it out in this fashion."183 The factors Dean Wade suggests considering 
in making this determination are: the usefulness and the desirability of the product, 
the availability of safer alternatives, the probability of injury and its seriousness, 
the obviousness of the danger, public expectation of the danger, and the ability to 
eliminate the danger without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product.I84 
This test defmes a product as "defective" by a combination of weighing benefits 
against risks and risks against the cost of risk avoidance. Whether or not the 
defendant produces a "defective" product through negligent acts is not at issue; 
what is at issue is whether the product, with its strengths and weaknesses, is one 
society finds, at the very least, tolerable. 
Though this test appears to avoid satisfactorily all the pitfalls the courts 
envisioned, it has not put the debate to rest; scholars and courts now argue whether 
the risk-utility definition is truly a strict liability standard or is in fact a variant of a 
negligence test18S Some courts and many scholars view the standard as "making a 
judgment about the manufacturer's judgment"186 and is therefore really a 
negligence test. "[I]f liability is to be imposed on the grounds that the 
manufacturer could have feasibly made the product safer (we use the term 
'feasibly' here to denote a risk/benefit analysis), then the inquiry must be based 
upon whether the conduct of the manufacturer was reasonable, that is, standard 
179. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 418, 573 P.2d 443, 446, 143 
Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978). 
180. Birnbaum, supra note 9, at 611; Strict Tort Liability, supra note 146, at 829. 
181. Birnbaum, supra 9, at 611; Dart, 147 Ariz. at 244, 7CFJ P. 2d at 878. 
182. Strict Tort Liability, supra note 146, at 829. 
183. [d. at 835. See, e.g., Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 430,573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 
at 236 ("[p]roduct may be found defective in design ••• if the jury finds that the risk of danger 
inherent in the challenged design outweighs the benefits of such design.''); Caterpillar Tractor 
Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871,886 (Alaska 1979) (following Barker, trial court may instruct jury 
that a product is defectively designed if "the plaintiff proves that the product's design 
proximately caused injury and the defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that on 
balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such 
design.',); and Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 n.1 (Tex. 1979) (a de-
fectively designed product is one that is unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into con-
sideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its use). See alsoDart,147 Ariz. at 
245, 709 P.2d at 879. 
184. Byrns v. Riddell, 113 Ariz. 264, 267, 550 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1976), 
summarizing Dean Wade's criteria. 
185. See Birnbaum, supra note 9, at 609; Epstein, supra note 38, at 474; Note, supra 
note 161, at 462; Barker, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225; Dart, 147 Ariz. 
242, 7CFJ P.2d 876. 
186. Birnbaum, supra note 9, at 609-10. 
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principles ofnegligence."187 Other courts and scholars argue to the contrary, that 
in fact the risk-utility test can be applied in a strict liability framework. These 
proponents argue that when the test is applied to the state of the product, rather 
than the manufacturer's conduct, it comports with the purpose of the strict liability 
approach. ISS 
It seems, however, that these disputes originate in interpretations driven by 
semantics rather than substance. What has been created with the risk-utility 
analysis is a new standard of culpability, one based on whether the risk introduced 
by the product is "reasonable," given its benefits, for society to tolerate. The fact 
that the term "reasonable" is used does not necessarily invoke the negligence 
standard of reasonable as in, for example, the "reasonable man." The reasonable 
man standard of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century impliedly held out 
that it was a uniform standard known to all and merely needed to be revealed in 
any particular instance by the pronouncements of a jury. The underlying 
presumption was that everyone should and could operate as the "reasonable man" 
would in a given situation, and their failure to do so (which was deemed 
negligence) gave rise to their liability for any ensuing harms. Implicit in such 
pronouncements was that "reasonable risk" was a well worked-out concept and 
understood by the community at large. 
Modem product design, while so miraculous, is also so complex that 
whether society considers, in any instance, the product's utility as outweighing the 
risks is not clear cut. In effect, it must be decided de novo with every modem 
invention. These are policy choices, value choices that society, not some 
manufacturer, makes. Risk-utility analysis presumes that the trier of fact, whether 
it be a trial judge or a jury, is society'S representative to make that decision and the 
risk-utility test provides guidelines for making a determination. In other words, 
the risk-utility approach asks the jury to decide in each instance whether the risks 
are reasonable for society to absorb given the benefits. In making this 
determination, the jury is not passing judgment on whether the manufacturer's 
conduct is reasonable. The jury's decision is a judgment, after the full 
ramifications are revealed, on whether the product is reasonable. "Reasonable" is 
a general broad-based word and can easily accommodate the two separate notions 
of reasonableness that exist here. 
The primary focus of the debate should be whether risk-utility will, in fact, 
impose greater liability than negligence and yet still be more circumscribed than 
absolute liability. When critics argue that they see negligence lurking in the corners 
of the cost-benefit calculations, they trigger an alarm set by the original intentions 
for developing a strict liability standard. Strict liability served to ensure that a 
significantly broader liability was to be imposed on the manufacturer than the 
negligence standard. When the critics argue that risk-utility acts as a judgment on 
187. Brady v. Melody Homes, 121 Ariz. 253, 259, 589 P.2d 896, 902 (Ct. App. 
1978). See also Cronin v. J.B.E. Olsen Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 
433 (1972) (determination of whether product is unreasonably dangerous, which requires 
weighing of benefits and risks, rings of negligence). 
188. Dart, 147 Ariz. at 246-47, 7(J) P.2d at 880-81; Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 426-34, 
573 P.2d at 453-57,143 Cal. Rptr. at 235-39. See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 
485,497-98,525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (1974) (same process of weighing the utility of the product 
against the risks it imposes is present in both strict liability and negligence, but strict liability 
looks at the product, not the reasonableness of the manufacturer's actions). See also, generally, 
Strict Tort Liability, supra note 146. 
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the manufacturer's judgment, the question is whether risk-utility's ability to assess 
the capabilities of the manufacturer is really at issue here. Clearly the answer is 
no. What is at issue is whether risk-utility analysis is capable of determining for 
society whether the product's combination of risks and benefits should be viewed 
as acceptable. The fact that the jury's determination can also act as a scorecard for 
the fortuitousness of the manufacturer's decisions is merely an incidental side-
effect of the primary purpose of the process. That risk-utility analysis also 
provides standards of social acceptability for which the manufacturers can strive is 
an additional benefit of the process, not a detraction. One must not lose sight of 
risk-utility's primary duty which is to establish a threshold of acceptable risk that 
every good must equal or exceed, a threshold that can rise with changing social 
and commercial experience. 
V. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS As A POLICY TOOL 
A. The Cost-Benefit Framework 
Functionally, cost-benefit analysis plays the same role that the avoidable 
accident approach played prior to the complications created by technological 
advances. Given the time and its milieu, the unavoidable accident test provided a 
reasonable standard for determining liability. It provided a clear demarcation for 
allocating the costs of risks between plaintiffs and defendants. The cost-benefit 
analysis does the same thing. In examining an unintentional harm, the court has an 
opportunity to weigh the value of the defendant's actions against the risk of harm 
or the possible benefit The difference between the two tests is one of complexity. 
The unavoidable accident standard focuses solely on the behavior of the defendant 
in the context of his surrounding circumstances.l89 The cost-benefit analysis is a 
more sophisticated test, requiring the balancing of several variables.190 Just as the 
unavoidable accident approach produced varying results in different situations 
before technological advance, so does cost-benefit analysis in the face of modern 
invention. Thus both tests satisfy the need for making distinctions among different 
situations. The fact that the cost-benefit approach is a more complex standard for 
assessing who should bear the cost of accidents in given situations is not 
surprising given the more complex nature of our society. The development of 
legal tests often mirrors the development of the community .191 
Given the nature of the inquiry, the choice of variables that are being 
weighed in the cost-benefit standard is entirely reasonable. One basic criticism that 
has been directed at the test, however, is the use of cold-blooded calculations in 
the realm of personal injury,192 How can a test that permits the acceptance of a 
189. See supra text accompanying notes 49-62. . 
190. See supra text accompanying notes 147-88. 
191. See, for example, the discussion oflegal tests for product liability in Barker: 
The technological revolution has created a society that contains dangers to 
the individual never before contemplated. The individual must face the threat to 
life and limb not only from the car on the street or highway but from a massive 
array of hazardous mechanisms and products. The radical change from a com-
paratively safe, largely agricultural, society to this industrial unsafe cne has been 
reflected in the decisions that formerly tied liability to the fault of a tortfeasor but 
now are more concerned with the safety of the individual who suffers the loss. 
Barker, 20 Cal. 3d. at 434-35,573 P.2d at 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239. 
192. It is unfortunate that cost-benefit analysis, a tool of some economic valid-
ity perhaps, was ever perverted to be applied to the comparison of risks to health 
versus a wide range of supposed benefits .... 
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certain number of deaths or injuries be an appropriate social mechanism for 
determining risks? 
It must be acknowledged that there is validity to the criticism. The test, 
unlike the more humanistic unavoidable accident approach, which focuses solely 
on the possibility of preventing harm, does in fact permit callous assessments of 
acceptable risks of personal injury to others. It may well be, however, that cost-
benefit tests reflects a human reality, recognizing that people do in fact make these 
kinds of assessments in all areas of life on a daily basis. What is perhaps startling 
to see is the test articulated formally and elevated to an institutionalized legal 
setting. It makes us uncomfortable. 
Yet, in a thousand ways, we willingly put strangers, our loved ones, and 
ourselves in danger every day. We drive our cars while slightly or not so slightly 
inebriated; 193 we keep matches, knives and guns in our homes where our children 
may and sometimes do get to them;l94 we smoke cigarettes;19S we overeat.l96 
These activities reflect that we have, on some level, made internal cost-benefit 
calculations. In each of these instances, we have made a decision that even though 
the consequences may be disastrous, the perceived probability of such occurrences 
is so small that we are willing to undertake the risk of the activity in order to derive 
its benefits. 
B. Economic Efficiency v. Policy Choices 
Clearly, weighing and balancing harms against benefits is a socially ac-
ceptable and useful approach for assessing liability. There are, however, other 
dimensions of this test that must also be considered in this context The test, on its 
It is impossible to develop a valid equation of human values to be bal-
anced each time ..• the popUlation [is] exposed to another toxic substance. It is 
thus critical to keep this catch-phrase out of public laws and agency policies. 
Zimmerman, Risk-Benefit Analysis: The Cop-Oul of Governmental Regulation, TRIAL, Feb. 
1978, at 47. 
This concern has often led to a common misunderstanding as to the role of prices in 
efficiency. For example, see, Vandall, Judge Posner's Negligence Efficiency Theory: A 
Critique, 35 EMORY LJ. 383, 384 (1986): 
Because our most important values lack a market, and cannot be assigned a price, 
it is not possible to engage in efficiency analysis in regard to personal injuries. 
That is, since it is not possible to discover a price for love, pain, depression, loss 
of a child, the burden of raising an unwanted child, supporting the handicapped, 
or encouraging children to explore, efficiency analysis rests upon speculation. 
193. According to Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), 23,900 people were 
killed in 1986 in drunk driving accidents. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ASS'N, 1986 
REPoRT (1986). 
194. According to the National Electronics Institute of Safety Surveillance (NEISS), 
approximately 800 children were injured by matches in 1986, and 10,000 by knives. NAT'L 
ELEC. INST. OF SAFETY SURVEILLANCE, U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMM'N, 
SUMMARY REPORT, NAT'L INJURY INFO. CLEARING HOUSE (1986). More than 27,000 12-
15 year-olds were handgun victims in 1985 (most recent figures). Thirty-eight percent of 
California households have guns. Kids: Deadly Force, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 11, 1988, at 18-19. 
195. The American Heart Association estimates that 350,000 Americans die each year 
from heart disease and cancer caused by smoking. AMERICAN HEART ASSOCIATION, 
PAMPHLET No. 51-033B (CP) 2-87-200M, SMOKING AND HEART DISEASE (1987). 
196. According to the National Center for Health Statistics, approximately 34 million 
U.S. adults (25.7%) are overweight, and approximately 13 million adults (9.4%) are severely 
overweight. NAJJAR & ROWLAND, DIVISION OF HEALTII EXAMINATION STATISTICS, 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR REALTII STATISTICS, No. 238 LC87-600186.S/N 017-022-01023-2, 
ANTIIROPOMETRIC REFERENCE DATA AND PREVALENCE OF OVERWEIGIIT (Oct., 1987). 
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face, appears neutral and indeed, it is often touted as exemplifying and promoting 
economic efficiency. 
Although economic efficiency is, in and of itself, a neutral method that seeks 
to maximize social benefits at minimum social costs, its application must inherently 
embody some prior judgment to assess the value of the benefits and the value of 
the costs. That judgment defmes what constitutes society's well-being and 
transcends the decision to maximize social welfare.l97 Just as the achievement of 
economic efficiency requires that a choice be made as to which social values are to 
be maximized, so must the application of cost-benefit analysis to any particular 
issue or dispute meet the same prerequisite to reach a policy decision. It is the 
failure to articulate the need for making some prior value judgments (as well as the 
failure to acknowledge the ability to accommodate a variety of value preferences) 
that has led to the confusion and controversy surrounding applications of the cost-
benefit test.198 
Mter the value judgment determining the nature of costs and benefits has 
been made, the cost-benefit formula promotes economic efficiency in the following 
way. By weighing and balancing harms against benefits, the cost-benefit formula 
provides incentives to induce situations in which the benefits outweigh the harms, 
and disincentives to discourage situations where'the harms outweighs the 
benefits.l99 When we aggregate these results we fmd that benefits are maximized 
while costs are minimized. Achieving this end is moving towards the goal of 
economic efficiency.200 
The difficulty is that while economic efficiency analysis itself is value-
neutral, the determination of what constitutes harms or benefits and their 
magnitude is not. That evaluation should reflect social decision-making that must 
be engaged in before economic efficiency analysis can be applied. So, for 
example, we must choose whether sex education in the schools should be 
fostered201 or prohibited,202 whether prisons should be punitive203 or rehabilita-
197. Treating a ••• court's task as merely one of toting up marginal costs and 
benefits ••• ignores the crucial questions of what counts as a cost or a benefit-
and who gets to decide that issue .••• [C]onstitutional choices affect, and hence 
require consideration of, the way in which a polity wishes to constitute itself. In 
making such choices, we reaffirm and create, select and shape, the values and 
truths we hold sacred. 
Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARv. L. REv. 592, 
595 (1985). 
"[C]ritics [of economic analysis] have suggested that because of the difficulty of quanti-
fying certain costs or benefits, the economic analyst will tend to substitute his own subjective 
values for these items, and therefore the analysis may simply 'confirm' his prior beliefs." A. 
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCI10N TO LAW AND EcoNOMICS 126 (1983). 
198. Punishing defendants for using a cost-benefit approach actually promotes 
economic inefficiency. For an example, see Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 
757,174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981), discussed infra text accompanying notes 269-86. 
199. See generally, Posner, supra note 14, at 32-33 (use of balancing formula maxi-
mizes society's welfare by preventing over investment in accident prevention). 
200. See A. POLINSKY, supra note 197, at 115-17. 
In disputes in which the parties are; in actuality or in effect, strangers-as in the 
nuisance law, automobile accident, and pollution control examples-it is possible 
to promote the equitable distribution of income through the legal system, but this 
can usually be done better through the government's tax and transfer system. 
Thus, efficiency generally should be the primary criterion for evaluating legal 
rules. 
201. Leo, Sex and Schools, AIDS and the Surgeon General add a New Urgency to an 
Old Debate, TIME, Nov. 24, 1986, ~t 54 (,'There is no doubt that we need sex education in 
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tive,204 or whether the Contras should be SUpported20S or abandoned.206 Even after 
deciding whether something is a harm or benefit, we must also decide how their 
measurements should be quantified. For example, we must evaluate the safety of 
human lives when we use pesticides in agriculture207 against the need for sufficient 
schools and that it must include infonnation on heterosexual and homosexual relationships •••• 
[W]ehave to be as explicit as necessary to get the message across. You can't talk of the dangers 
of snake poisoning and not mention snakes." (quoting Surgeon General C. Everett Koop's 
October 1986 report on AIDS)). 
202. See id. at 54-55 ("The way sex education is taught in the schools encourages ex-
perimentation. It's the cause of promiscuity and destroys the natural modesty of girls." 
(quoting Phyllis Schlafly)). 
Our schools have enough of a job teaching reading and writing without teaching 
values about sex. • •• The [sex-education] texts I read ••• totally neglect the 
traditional values that may be important to a student's family and church and im-
pose a psuedomorality: 'If you can't be good, be careful' •••• Since adequate 
information ••• is available through clinics and hospitals, it isn't necessary or 
appropriate for public schools to provide it, too. 
Your Opinion, SEVENTEEN MAGAZINE, Sept., 1984, at 56. 
203. Punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation of 
wrong-doing: and, in order to maintain respect for law, it is essential that the 
punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt 
by the great majority of citizens for them. • •. The truth is that some crimes are 
so outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment, because the wrong-
doer deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not. 
ROYAL COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNIsHMENT (1949), reprinted in S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER, 
& M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAw AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 190-91 (4th 
ed.,1983). 
[What the criminal fears is] umelenting punishment. That is what he under-
stands, and nothing else, and that fear is the only thing which will force him into 
the ranks of the law abiding. . •• If we wait upon the medical quacks, the parole 
panderers, and the misguided sympathizers with habitual criminals to protect our 
lives and property from the criminal horde, then we must also resign ourselves to 
increasing violence, robbery, and sudden death. 
Address by J. Edgar Hoover, Daughters of the American Revolution Annual Convention (Apr. 
23, 1963) reprinted in Morris & Hawkins, Attica Revisited: The Prospect for Prison Reform, 14 
ARIZ. L. REv. 747, 753-54 (1972). 
204. [W]e must somehow escape from the crippling idleness, lack of training, 
inhumanity and futility of the mega-prison system which still characterizes most 
state systems. We know that the prisoner must be given work and an opportu-
nity to develop himself, and that if we wish to reduce his later depredations on 
society, it is incumbent on us to give him some opportunity of a tolerable life of 
conformity when he is released from our control ••.• We know all these things 
and some of them we have known for over a century. The riots and strikes have 
merely underlined the need for renovation of our correctional system. 
Morris & Hawkins, supra note 203, at 747. 
205. [p]reventing the establishment of a Leninist dictatorship in Nicaragua is a 
goal worthy of American support, and that those willing to fight for this cause are 
deserving of American assistance. A decision to support one side in a civil war is 
not one to be taken lightly. We come to it in the full realization that, whatever 
tragedy it brings, the liquidation of the democratic side of Nicaraguan civil war 
will bring infmitely more tragedy to Nicaragua, to Central America, and ulti-
mately to the rest of the western hemisphere. 
The Case for the Contras, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 24, 1986, at 9. 
206. "Military aid to the Contras would simply up the ante in the Nicaraguan Civil 
War •••• It would again put this nation in the dubious position of seeking to overthrow a gov-
ernment that most of the world, including our own allies, regards as legitimate." Herald-Leader 
of Lexington editorial, reprinted in THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 17, 1986, at 71. 
207. No one is quite sure how many people in the United States are poisoned 
by pesticides each year ... or even how many are at risk of falling ill from pes-
ticide exposure. • •• Farm worker's organizations in various states paint a ••• 
disturbing picture: in some instances, fully two-thirds of the work force has been 
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food production to feed the world population.20B Applying cost-benefit tests does 
not avoid the necessity of making those value choices, and facing up to those 
responsibilities should shift concerns away from the use of cost-benefit reasoning 
to the heart of social debate where they belong. 
VI. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS As A POLICY CHOICE 
AMONG POLICY CHOICES: ECONOMIC REASONING IN THE 
COURTS 
It is important to understand all the dimensions in which value judgments 
occur when one uses a cost-benefit approach. Not only do the evaluations of the 
factors entering into a cost-benefit determination reflect value choices, but the very 
decision to apply cost-benefit analysis is itself also a policy decision. As noted 
above, abandonment of the unavoidable accident approach and the use of the cost-
benefit test was a social policy choice.209 It reflects a decision to use a criterion of 
weighing and balancing instead of a standard that m~ures liability in the more 
absolute terms of accident avoidance. That this is a value choice becomes even 
more apparent when we examine how modem day courts decide whether to apply 
a cost-benefit analysis or another standard for determining liability. 
Ironically, our first case, in which the court rejects the results of a cost-
benefit analysis in favor of a more stringent test, is an opinion by Judge Posner, a 
strong advocate of the Carroll Towing formula. In Duckworth v. Franzen,2l0 
prisoners brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injuries sustained when the bus 
in which they were chained caught fire. The prisoners claimed that prison officials 
violated the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.211 Judge Posner had to decide on what basis liability could be as-
sprayed directly or covered with drifting insecticides, while an even greater num-
ber may be contaminated by 'dislodgeable residues,' which shake loose from 
standing crops. 
Wiles, Pesticide Risk to Farm Workers, 241 NATION 10, 306 (1985). 
208. "Pesticides are remarkably beneficial, for they increase the volume and quality of 
agricultural produce and save millions of human lives that would otherwise be sacrificed to 
insect-transmitted diseases." Edwards, Pesticide Safety: A Response, CONSUMER REsEARCH 
MAGAZINE, Feb. 1988, at 34, 35. 
209. See supra text accompanying notes 157-60. 
210. 780 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 u.s. 816 (1986). 
211. A bus containing 35 prisoners caught fire. The prisoners were in handcuffs and 
all prisoners on each side of the aisle were joined by a chain running through the handcuffs. All 
exits to the bus but the front door had been sealed and a metal screen separated the passengers 
from the front door. The bus filled with dense smoke and neither group of prisoners was able to 
leave the bus; the one prisoner who succeeded in getting away by slipping off his handcuffs was 
pushed back onto the bus by a guard. Eventually guards equipped with gas masks cut through 
the chains and brought the prisoners out. One prisoner died; others suffered serious lung 
damage. [d. at 648. 
Twenty-one prisoners brought suit against three prison officials and three guards under 
section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, charging cruel and unusual punishment The com-
plaint included a pendent claim against the six defendanlS for negligence and a diversity claim 
against the manufacturer of the bus for product liability. The district judge severed the pendent 
claim and the suit against the bus company. In the jury trial in district court, judgment was for 
the plaintiffs and a jury award of $561,000 against three of the defendants, exonerating the 
prison guards. [d. at 648. The three defendants found liable-the then head of the Illinois 
prison system at the time of the fife; the then prison warden of the prison from which the bus 
was leaving; and the director of security at the prison-appealed. They claimed that the ppson-
ers were suing them in their official capacities and such suits were barred by the eleventh 
amendment. [d. at 648-49. 
116 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [32:1 
signed under the eighth amendment.212 Feeling that "[t]he reigning fonnula of ... 
'deliberate indifference' ... evades rather than expresses precise meaning,''213 
Judge Posner choose instead to assign liability on the basis of whether the gov-
ernment officials' actions constituted recklessness. He then addressed two 
possible choices for defining recklessness, one from tort law and the other from 
criminal law. 
Upon considering a tort law standard, Judge Posner decided that reck-
lessness can be equated with the tort notion of gross negligence.214 He modified 
the Learned Hand fonnula for simple negligence so that it could characterize a 
gross negligence standard for recklessness. Judge Posner then defined 
"recklessness" as occurring when "the disparity between the cost of prevention and 
the expected accident cost is great''21S Under that definition, it would be easy for 
the court to fmd, given the facts, that the prison officials had acted recklessly.216 
The court first considered the eleventh amendment question. Judge Posner concluded 
that the defendants were being sued in their individual capacities and, therefore, the suit was not 
barred. [d. at 649-50. By the same token. the defendants could be liable only for their individ-
ual wrong doing. Hence, the suit against the head of the prison system was dismissed, since 
there is no doctrine of respondent superior under section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and 
no evidence of his individual wrong-doing had been offered. [d. at 650. The other two prison 
officials, however, were considered to be personally involved in security and safety and there-
fore subject to closer scrutiny. 
212. [d. at 651-56 
213. [d. at 652. The Supreme Court decided, in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 
(1976), that the standard for eighth amendment violations in this context was "deliberate indif-
ference." [d. at 104. The court, however, left the content of that test ambiguous. See id. at 109 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
214. Gross negligence is a tort standard considerably stricter than its milder cousin, 
ordinary negligence. The Supreme Court found in Estelle v. Gamble that mere negligence was 
not enough to constitute an eighth amendment violation. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 
(1976). The Court left open the question. as the dissent in Gamble (Gamble, 429 U.S. at 117 
n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting» and Judge Posner (Duckworth, 780 F.2d at 652) pointed out, 
whether ''reckless or 'gross negligence •• .' is enough to trigger ••• protection •••• " Daniels 
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986) (Though Daniels' focus is on violations of the due 
process clause, Whitley v. Albers ruled that in the context of prison security if the harm violates 
the fourteenth amendment it also violates the eighth amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 
312, 327 (1986». 
215. Duckworth, 780 F.2d at 652. Posner's assertion derives from his modification 
of the Carroll Towing formula. Ordinarily the Carroll Towing formula draws the demarcation 
line between ordinary negligent and non-negligent behavior when the expected harm equals the 
cost of avoiding it. That is, if the particular facts and circumstances are such that the expected 
harm is less than the cost of avoiding it, failure to avoid it is deemed not to be negligent. If the 
expected harm is greater than the cost of avoiding it then to fail to avoid the harm is found to be 
negligent. Algebraically, this translates as follows, where P is the probability of harm, L is the 
value of the actual harm if it occurs (L stands for liability), and B is the cost of avoiding the harm 
(B stands for the burden of avoiding the harm): 
IfP x L < B (where "<" means "less than'') then if defendant does not incur the 
burdens to avoid the accident, he is not negligent. On the other hand ifP xL> B 
(where ''>'' means "greater than'') then if the defendant fails to undertake to avoid 
the accident, he is negligent. 
See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text. 
Borrowing from the ordinary negligence formula, Judge Posner dermes "gross negli-
gence" as those instances where the expected harm (P x L) greatly exceeds (''»'') the cost of 
avoiding it (B). Hence, his statement to which this footnote is appended in the text above. Such 
a definition is fully consistent with the Supreme Court's holdings. 
216. Clearly, keeping the prisoners chained to a bus left them vulnerable and without 
the ability to protect themselves from a whole myriad of accidents that might befall a vehicle. 
Thus the expected harm is not particularly low and might, given the possibility of loss of life, be 
considered fairly high. What would be at issue is the cost of avoiding the accident. The answer 
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After using cost-benefit analysis to defme recklessness, however, Judge 
Posner then rejected it in favor of an alternative higher standard, one which is more 
familiar to criminal law. This defmition of recklessness imposes liability only on 
those who commit "an act so dangerous that the defendant's knowledge of the risk 
can be inferred.''217 The reason he offered for choosing this higher standard is that 
he felt it comported with the language of the eighth amendment which prohibits 
cruel and unusual punishment in that, as Judge Posner noted, "infliction of 
punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter.''218 Judge Posner 
found that the tort standard of gross negligence for recklessness derived from the 
Learned Hand formula "does not import danger so great that knowledge of the 
danger can be inferred.''219 While that may well be true, Posner's choice of 
standards means that prison officials will be liable under the eighth amendment 
only when the act is extremely dangerous, so dangerous that knowledge can be 
inferred. The use of a criminal intent standard in the context of a suit for damages 
under the federal civil rights law clearly constitutes a policy choice. 
The converse situation in which a traditional standard gives way to a cost-
benefit result also reveals a policy choice. In Llaguno v. Mingey,2'lJ) plaintiffs also 
brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 charging members of the Chicago police 
department with having entered and searched the home of one of the plaintiff's 
seizing him without probable cause or a warrant.2.21 On appeal, Judge Posner held 
would probably hinge upon the cost of alternative means of safeguarding prisoners other than 
chaining them to the bus and forcing them back in the bus after the bus caught fire. 
217. Duckworth,780 F.2d at 652. 
218. Id. The Supreme Court in Gamble did not make it clear whether deliberate indif-
ference required a criminal intent standard. "If [the majority's opinion] is meant to indicate that 
intent is a necessary part of an Eighth Amendment violation, I disagree." Gamble, at 116 n.13 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). u[W]hether the constitutional standard has been violated should turn 
on the character of the punishment rather than the motivation of the individual who inflicted it." 
Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Clearly, Judge Posner felt that this ambiguity left him free 
to choose from different definitions of recklessness. 
219. Duckworth, 780 F.2d at 653. It is not clear whether Posner's concern is for 
knowledge or degree of harm. His test is set up so that even if the conduct. is reckless in the 
criminal sense it may not be reckless in the tort sense. In other words, it is conceivable that the 
cost of avoiding the accident (e.g., the cost of the alternative for guarding the prisoners) may be 
so great that even if the expected harnI is extremely great, the disparity between the two may not 
be sufficiently great to constitute Judge Posner's definition of gross negligence. 
220. 763 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 
221. Two young Hispanic men in Chicago committed two robberies, killed four peo-
ple, wounded three others, and abducted a young girl. . The getaway car crashed and the police 
shot and captured one of the men. The other escaped on foot. The license plate number of the 
car showed it as registered to one Vilma Llaguno at an address two miles from the crash site and 
the owner had not reported it as stolen. The police went to the Llaguno home and ordered the 
woman who answered the door to open it. When she did so, the policc rushed in with drawn 
guns, searched the house, and herded the occupants into the living room. In response to ques-
tions from the police, one of the Llaguno children, David, said that he owned the car and had 
loaned it to a friend. There was conflicting testimony about whether David revealed the name of 
the friend upon questioning and whether the police threatened to shoot the occupants of the 
house. The police later came back to the house; it was disputed whether they entered the second 
time without consent. The police spoke to David again, then arrested him and held him in cus-
tody for 42 hours without charging him. While the police were in the house, officers shot and 
killed the fleeing man, another son of the Llagunos who did not live in the house. I d. at 1563. 
The Llagunos brought suit charging that their fourth amendment rights had been violated. 
The district court judge refused to direct a verdict for the plaintiffs and the jury found for the de-
fendants. A panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court should 
have directed a verdict for the plaintiffs. On rehearing en bane, the court concluded that the trial 
court was correct not to give a directed verdict, but that errors entitled plaintiffs to a new trial. 
Id. at 1563-64. 
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that even though "the present case is close to the line that separates arguably 
reasonable from unarguably unreasonable police behavior, it does not cross it" 222-
As Judge Posner himself acknowledged, "this case is more difficult ... because 
the police had less reason to be confident that they really were in hot pursuit of the 
killer when they entered the Llagunos' house. ''223 
Traditional fourth amendment jurisprudence requires both probable cause 
and warrant for the police to search a home. The warrant can be dispensed with, 
but only upon a showing of exigent circumstances.224 The requirement for 
probable cause in this context cannot be waived and indeed where exigent cir-
cumstances do permit search without a warrant, the courts tend to scrutinize the 
probable cause very carefully.22S 
The difficulty with the Llaguno case is that although there was arguably an 
emergency situation226 it is highly questionable that there was probable cause 
shown.227 Judge Posner nonetheless upheld the intrusion by making the test for 
obtaining the warrant "reasonableness" in which probable cause was merely one 
contributing factor that 'need not necessarily be met.228 He employed Judge 
The court acknowledged that police may not enter a person's home without either a war-
rant or consent, even where there is probable cause, except in an emergency. If the police had 
probable cause to believe that a killer was in the house, "[t]he situation was an emergency in 
about as vivid a sense as can be imagined."ld. at 1564. In deciding whether police could enter a 
home, the court had said in United States v. Acevedo, 627 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1976), that the 
question was simply "whether the exceedingly strong privacy interest in one's residence is 
outweighed by the risk that delay will engender injury, destruction of evidence, or escape." 
Llaguno, 763 F.2d at 1564 (quoting Acevedo, 627 F.2d at 70). 
222. Llaguno, 763 F.2d at 1565. 
223. ld. at 1567. 
224. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) ("Only in exigent cir-
cumstances will the judgment of the police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient authoriza-
tion for a search.',); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970) (court declines to hold that an 
arrest on street near house "can provide its own 'exigent circumstance' so as to justify a warrant-
less search of the arrestee's house"); and Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) 
(search incident to an arrest cannot extend beyond area within which suspect might gain a 
weapon or destructible evidence without a warrant). 
225. Posner states, "[t]rue, other cases where an emergency has been held to justify a 
search without a warrant have involved a clearer showing of probable cause for the search than 
this case." Llaguno, 763 F.2d at 1564. See, e.g.,Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297-99, 
(1967); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc) ("[T]here 
[must] exist[ ] not merely the minimum of probable cause, that is requisite even when a warrant 
has been issued, [] but beyond that a clear showing of probable cause •••• ); Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (probable cause absent exigent circumstances did not justify war-
rantless search). 
226. Judge Wood, in an opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part, disP.utes 
whether, in fact, an emergency existed. He notes that not only was there a magistrate available 
but the police drove back to headquarters to obtain a shotgun and sledgehammer providing an 
opportunity to get a warrant as well. Furthermore, there were numerous policemen already on 
the scene who could have put the house under surveillance while a warrant was obtained. 
Laguna, 763 F.2d at 1579 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
227. ld. at 1578-79 (Wood, J., dissenting) ("It seems to me that you have to concede 
that probable cause in the traditional sense is lacking in this case, and that a magistrate would not 
have authorized the search warrant''). 
228. Judge Posner justified his position by citing the opinions of Dorman, 435 F.2d at 
393, and United States v. Robinson, 533 F.2d 578, 583-84 (D.C. Cir. 1975), both of which 
had the same author, Judge Leventhal. Dorman listed six factors necessary for a warrantless 
search, one in particular being a "clear showing of probable cause." Dorman, 435 F.2d at 392 
(see supra note 225). In Robinson, the police entered a vehicle from which a suspect just left, 
which they believed was the getaway vehicle from a bank robbery. The Robinson court noted 
that the police had five of the six factors listed in Dorman: 
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Hand's Carroll Towing balancing test to show the potential hann from waiting for 
a warrant.229 He then, as Judge Wood observed in dissent, "ma[d]e up that 
shortage [of probable cause] by adding exigent circumstances.''230 Thus, Judge 
Posner chose to abandon the traditional fourth amendment jurisprudence anlilysis, 
which requires a showing of probable cause independent of any question of 
exigent circumstances.231 He substituted instead a balancing test that allowed the 
[W]e have a grave offense; a clear showing of probable cause; reasonable belief 
that the suspects are armed; a liklihood that the suspects will escape if not speedily 
aprehended, and peaceable entry. This case lacks the element of 'strong reason to 
believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered,' [ ] which was stressed 
in Dorman as justifying a warrentless entry into the suspect's home to make an ar-
rest. [] But in the case of a car on the street there is both lessor expectation of 
privacy then in a home ••• and the entry into a car believed strong probable cause 
to be the gettaway car is justified, even though the suspect is plainly not now 
inside, in order to get clues that will aid location and apprehension of the suspect. 
Robinson, 533 F.2d at 583-84 (footnotes omitted). 
Even though the Robinson court excused the absence of one of the six Dorman factors 
on the basis that the search was of an empty vehicle which has a lessor expectation of privacy, 
Judge Posner concluded that Robinson supports the absence of any of the factors in the case of 
searching a private home, including inferentially, probable cause. Llaguno, 763 F.2d at 1564. 
One might reasonably argue, however, that in fact Judge Posner is merely substituting his own 
value choices for legal precedence. 
229. The use of balancing formulas to decide fourth amendment cases has drawn some 
criticism from members of the Supreme Court itself. For example, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
Justice Brennan says: 
In the past several terms, this Court has produced a succession of Fourth 
Amendment opinions in which 'balancing tests' have been applied to resolve 
various questions concerning the proper scope of official searches. . .. In my 
view, the presence of the word 'unreasonable' in the text of the Fourth 
Amendment does not grant a shifting majority of this Court the authority to an-
swer all Fourth Amendment questions by consulting its momentary vision of the 
social good. 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 369-70 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) 
230. Llaguno,763 F.2d at 1578 (Wood, J., dissenting) ("Insufficient probable cause 
is why the majority needs to invent this new blended warrantless search concept.''). 
231. The staunchness of the judiciary's position that probable cause is a requirement 
that must be met independently of any consideration of exigent circumstances to justify warrant-
less searches can be seen by the following: 
In enforciIig the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, the Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum 
requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution. As a general 
rule, it has also required the judgment of a magistrate on the probable-cause issue 
and the issuance of a warrant before a search is made. Only in exigent circum-
stances will the judgment of the police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient 
authorization for a search. 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1975) (emphasis added). 
'[T)he warrantless intrusion into the home is one that cannot be sanctioned under 
the Fourth Amendment •.• absent exigent circumstances.' (quoting United 
States v. Houle, 603 F.2d 1297 (8th Cir. 1979» • • •. [However, e]ven assum-
ing for the purpose of discussion the existence of exigent circumstances, the war-
rantless entry in the present case is unlawful because there is no probable cause. 
United States v. Williams, 604 F.2d 1102, 1121-22 (8th Cir. 1979). 
The State cites the Supreme Court opinion of Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 
87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967), and urges that police entry into a 
dwelling in search of a suspect, without probable cause to believe that he is 
within, may be constitutionally reasonable if certain exigent circumstances exist. 
But in Hayden the police in fact had probable cause ••• and the Hayden opinion 
does not suggest that exigent circumstances may eliminate the need for police to 
have probable cause to belieye the suspect is inside the premises to be searched. 
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weight of one factor to offset the lack of weight of the other. Such a decision 
changes the role that the probable cause standard plays in pennitting warrantless 
searches. Instead of probable cause being the constitutional absolute that must be 
met, under Judge Posner's rule, some lesser standard will be sufficient to 
authorize the police to invade the privacy of one's home without a warrant.232 In 
Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280,1293 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 428 U.S. 465 
(1976). See also Edwards v. United States, 364 A.2d. 1209, 1214 (D.C. 1976) ("[p]olice who 
enter a private dwelling to make an arrest or affect a seizure of contraband without a warrant 
must have clear<ut probable cause ... .''); Note, Warrantless Entry Without Probable Cause: A 
Diluting of the Fourthl!mendment? State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N.W.2d 835 (1978),12 
CREIGHTON L. REv. 187, 191 (1978) ("[p]robable cause forms the core of the fourth amend-
ment. While a warrant may be dispensed within certain circumstances • • • the fourth 
amendment demands that each search or seizure be based at least upon probable cause.'') 
(emphasis added). 
232. Though Judge Posner does not spell out how to apply the Learned Hand formula 
in this instance, a comparison between the traditional standard and Posner's standard would be 
as follows. 
Since probable cause addresses the issue as to the likelihood that the evidence will be 
found in the home the police wish to search, probable cause, in reality, represents a probability. 
In other words, in order to satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the probability that the evi-
dence is where the police hope to fmd it must pass some threshold value. Let P represent the 
probability that the evidence is where the police wish to look. 
Similar to probable cause, exigent circumstances also raises questions of probability. 
The question of exigent circumstances asks whether the probability is sufficiently high that the 
evidence, if it is in the home to be searched, will be destroyed in the course of a delay to get a 
warrant. In order to justify not delaying a search to get a warrant, the probability of destruction 
must pass some threshold. Clearly there is no probability of destruction if the evidence is not 
where the police think it is. Let D be the probability of destruction. 
Traditionally, the test for determining when a warrantless search is permitted is multi-
faceted. One requirement is that the probability that the evidence is where the police think it is, 
P, must pass the probable cause threshold. In other words, P must be at least as high as the 
probable cause standard: 
P ~probable cause standard. 
This is the standard that must be met if there is a search, with or without a warrant. 
A second requirement raises the question as to whether there are sufficient exigent cir-
cumstances to justify a warrantless search. In other words, D, the probability of destruction 
must equal or exceed the threshold for exigent circumstances: 
D ~ exigent circumstances standard. 
In some instances, when the issue is whether a gUilty party will flee, the court will also 
consider the degree of ctime in justifying exigent circumstances. See, e.g., Welsh v. 
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984). If that is the case, then an additional standard would require 
that the value of the harm equal or exceed some value. In other words, let V be the value of the 
harm if a fleeing suspect escaped (or a piece of evidence were destroyed) then: 
V ~ sufficient seriousness of harm. 
Thus, the traditional evaluation of whether a warrantless search is justified can be sum-
marized mathematically as follows: 
If and only if 
(a) the probable cause standard is met, i.e., 
P ~ probable cause standard, 
and if and only if 
(b) the exigent circumstances standard is also met, i.e., 
D ~ exigent circumstances standard, 
and (in some situations) if and only if 
(e) the sufficient harm standard is met, i.e., 
V ~ sufficient seriousness of harm 
then and only then is a warrantless search justified. 
Judge Posner applies a different standard. Judge Posner also considers the gravity of 
harm arising from the potential flight of a suspect in his assessment of a warrantless search. 
Contrary to other courts, however, which require that the probability of destruction satisfy the 
exigent circumstances standard, Judge Posner allows the gravity of harm to off-set the short-fall 
in probability of destruction. ''The greater that harm would be, the less need be the probability 
1990] RISK-UTILITY ANALYSIS 121 
Llaguno, Judge Posner allowed a combination ofhann and probability to offset the 
short-falls in probable cause. "The potential hann from waiting for a search 
warrant in this case was very great even though it was far from certain that an 
immediate search would be productive."233 
Presumably, Judge Posner has his own threshold standard of seriousness 
that the combination of the three variables - probable cause, exigent 
circumstances, and gravity of hann - must meet in order to satisfy his re-
quirement of warrantless searches.234 Thus, instead of the traditional requirement 
of three independent absolutes that must be met, Judge Posner's standard merely 
requires that the three variables satisfy one inequality jointly. This formulation 
permits a warrantless search even when there is an extremely small probability that 
the police have reliable information about a fleeing suspect being in a particular 
home. Even if probable cause is extremely ambiguous, if the gravity of hann (a 
sought-for killer) or its probability of occurrence (who might escape) are 
sufficiently large, the combination can satisfy Judge Posner's standard. In other 
words, probable cause can be far from satisfied and now a warrantless search 
would be permitted after Llaguno, as long as the potential hanD and the probability 
of escape or destruction is sufficiently high. This permits the police to engage in 
warrantless searches in circumstances under which they would not be able to 
obtain a warrant, there~y encouraging a preference for warrantless searches. 
Similar results can occur even when exigent circumstances do not exist. 
According to Judge Posner's standard, if the probability of escape or destruction 
do not satisfy the requirement of exigent circumstances, as long as the gravity of 
the hann is sufficiently large in the small chance it did occur, such requirements 
can be dispensed with. Such results only serves to further encourage warrantless 
searches. Judge Posner's rule expresses a preference for a trade-off analysis to an 
absolute standard and reflects a value choice. 
A policy determination is being made even when courts substitute one 
balancing test for another. In American Hospital Supply Co. v. Hospital Products 
Ltd.,23s Judge Posner substituted the Carroll Towing formula236 for the multi-
that it would have actually occurred to justify the police invading the interest .•• in the privacy 
of the home." (Uaguno, 763 F.2d at 1564). Mathematically, this can be represented as: 
DV ~ Posner's standard for exigent circumstances 
where if D, the probability of destruction, is not sufficiently high to meet his standard, then if V, 
the value of the evidence if lost, is great enough then the combination may satisfy Judge 
Posner's requirement 
233. Llaguno, 763 F.2d at 1564. 
234. Mathematically, his standard looks as follows: 
DVP > Posner's standard for warrantless search. 
235. 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1985). American Hospital Supply Corporation was the 
exclusive distributor for Hospital Products. The original contract between the two corporations 
was for three years initially, but provided that it would be renewed for successive one year peri-
ods (to a limit of ten years) unless American Hospital Supply notified Hospital Products at least 
90 days before the expiration date of its current contract American Hospital Supply failed to 
terminate its contract and in response to a direct query from Hospital Products announced that it 
considered the contract renewed. Nonetheless, Hospital Products informed American Hospital 
Supply the next day that American was no longer an authorized distributor of its products. [d. at 
592. 
American Hospital Supply brought suit for breach of contract and moved for preliminary 
injunction to prevent Hospital Products from acting in derogation of its contract rights. The in-
junction was granted by the district court [d. at 592-93. Two months after the entry of the 
injunction, Hospital Products filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. Hospital Products moved 
for the bankruptcy court to cancel the renewed contract, on grounds that it was still executory at 
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factor test traditionally used by the lower federal courts in detennining whether to 
grant preliminary injunctions, claiming it is merely a "distillation" of the prior 
teSt.237 He disavowed any intent to change the law, stating "[t]he fonnula is new; 
the analysis it capsulizes is standard."238 Judge Swygert's dissenting opinion, 
however, makes it clear that the application of the traditional test would have 
yielded a different result. Indeed, as Judge Swygert noted, "if nothing is added to 
the substantive law, why bother?''239 
If the fonnula is to be taken seriously, at the very least it modifies the ways 
in which the factors enter into the balancing test. The Learned Hand fonnula 
prescribes that each factor be considered with a predesignated importance relative 
to the other factors, and any adjustment in that weight is based solely on the 
factor's magnitude. In the traditional test the district court judge has the discretion 
to decide, beyond each factor's magnitude, which set of factors he wishes to 
emphasize. So, for example, in a particular case it may be that the harm to the 
defendant is greater than the harm to the plaintiff, but the probability'of winning is 
greater for the plaintiff than for the defendant. Under certain circumstances the 
judge may feel that it is more equitable to emphasize the probability of success 
whereas in other situations the court might view the degree of harm as more 
important. On its face, the Learned Hand fonnula does not pennit this kind of 
equitable discretion. The fonnula dictates the result solely according to the 
magnitudes of the numbers and the way they interact with each other in the 
fonnula; the result cannot be tempered by notions of fairness arising from any 
particular fact situations before the court. In other words, if the numbers in the 
two different hypotheticals noted above were exactly the same, the Learned Hand 
the time of the declaration of bankruptcy and subject to disaffinnance. The bankruptcy courts 
decision was still pending at the time of the appeal from the preliminary injunction by Hospital 
Products. [d. at 593. 
236. The formula Judge Posner uses, although equivalent to Judge Hand's formula, 
actually takes a somewhat different form. Judge Posner weighs the probability of the plaintiffs 
success (Pp), multiplied by the harm Q:!p) failure to grant him an injunction would yield (i.e., 
when consIdered altogether the plaintiu's "expected harm," Pp x Hp - see supra note 154-56) 
against the harm (H.V that would be done to the defendant by granting an injunction mUltiplied by 
the probability the defendant will prevail, P d (i.e., the defendant's "expected harm," P d x H.t -
suprtZjnote 154-56). This measure balances expected harm to the plaintiff against expected harm 
to the defendant. American Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 593. Since either the plaintiff or the 
defendant must win, that means that the sum of the plaintiffs probability of victory and the 
defendant's probability must add up to 100 percent (when using percentages) or, equivalently, 1 
(when using fractions). Judge Posner redefines (correctly) the defendant's probability of win-
ning as 1 minus the plaintiff's probability of winning. In other words, since Pp + Pd = I, sub-
tracting Pp from both sides of the equation yields Pd = 1 - Pp. Thus Judge Posner's balancing 
equation looks as follows: 
grant a preliminary injunction if 
plaintiff's expected harm exceeds defendant's expected harm 
Pp x Hp > (I-PP) x Hd. 
(Since there is only one probability variable in the ultimate expression of the equation, Judge 
Posner substitutes the symbol P for Pp in his formulation.) 
237. American Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 593. The usual test considered several 
factors: whether the plaintiff will be irreparably harmed if the preliminary injunction is denied; 
whether the plaintiff's harm upon denial will exceed the defendant's; whether the plaintiff is rea-
sonably likely to prevail at trial; and whether the public interest will be affected by granting or 
denying the injunction. [d. at 594. 
238. [d. at 593-94. 
239: [d. at 609 (Swygert, J., dissenting). 
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fonnula would yield the same result in both cases, whereas with the traditional 
balancing test, the judge could reach different conclusions in each case.240 
The substitution of the Learned Hand fonnula can also affect the way the 
Court of Appeals reviews the district courts' granting or denial of preliminary 
injunctions. Although the standard of review, "abuse of discretion," presumably 
would remain unchanged, the fonnula expands the circumstances under which an 
abuse of discretion may be found. The use of a mathematical fonnula narrows the 
circumstances in which discretion can be viewed as reasonable, thereby facilitating 
the appellate court's rmding that the district court's decision was an abuse.241 
Thus, American Hospital demonstrates that the use of a balancing test as opposed 
to an absolute, or some other standard for legal detenninations does not, in and of 
itself, derme the full scope of the value choice. How the balancing test is actually 
structured embodies value choices as well. 
A different policy decision may involve comb~g cost-benefit analysis and 
some other operative standard. In Barker v. Lull Engineering,242 the plaintiff-
worker was injured while operating a forklift manufactured by defendant. Plaintiff 
sued defendant on the basis that there was a design defect in defendant's machine 
that caused plaintiffs injury.243 The jury verdict for defen.dant was reversed by the 
California Supreme Court.244 
240. As Judge Swygert noted in his dissent, the four-pronged test may lack precision, 
but "such 'precision' is antithetical to the underlying principles of injunctive relief." Equity 
consideration cannot be quantified, and decisions depend on the "feel" of the case. [d. 
241. ''The traditional element.of discretion residing in the decision of a trial court to 
grant a preliminary injunction has been all but eliminated by today's decision." [d. 
242. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). 
243. Plaintiff, who had received only limited instruction in the use of the fork lift, was 
injured when he was attempting to lift a load oflumber to a height of approximately 18 to 20 feet 
and to place the load on the second story of a building under construction. The terrain on which 
the fork lift operated sloped sharply in several directions, a fact which complicated the operation 
of the lift. Other workers shouted to the plaintiff that the load was beginning to tip and plaintiff 
jumped off the fork lift; while scrambling away a piece of lumber struck him on the head and 
caused serious injury. [d. at 419, 573 P.2d at 447, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229. 
At trial, plaintiff's expert witness testified that the fork lift was unstable because of its 
narrow base, that it should have been equipped with outriggers (mechanical arms that could be 
extended independently and placed on the ground to lend stability); that the loader should have 
had a roll bar and seat belt; and finally that the placement of the leveling lever and absence of an 
automatic lock on the lever made it likely the operator would bump and accidentally move the 
lever. [d. at 420-21,573 P.2d at 447-48, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229-30. The defense testified that 
the loader was stable when used on the terrain for which it was designed and any instability was 
caused by operating it on steep terrain for which it was not intended. Similarly, outriggers were 
unnecessary when the loader was operated on the terrain for which it was intended. 
Furthermore, the bulk of the loader meant it would not roll completely over, so that a roll bar 
was unnecessary. Defense also testified that the manual lock on the leveling device provided ad-
equate protection and the positioning of the lever was the safest and most convenient for the 
operator. Finally, seat belts would not add to the safety because they prevented the operator 
from exiting quickly. [d. at 421-22, 573 P.2d at 448-49, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 230-31. 
After a jury trial verdict for the defendants, the plaintiff appealed on the basis that the 
judge's jury instructions were in error. The trial court had.instructed the jurors that strict liability 
for a defect in design is based on finding the product ''um~nably dangerous" for its intended 
use. California had explicitly rejected the "umeasonably dangerous" test in Cronin v. J.B.E. 
Olson Corp. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 
417,573 P.2d at 446, 143 ~al. Rptr. at 228. 
244. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 417,573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228. 
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There are several tests that might be applicable in a design defect case, 
including the Restatement o/Torts' "unreasonably dangerous" standard.245 The 
"unreasonably dangerous" test holds manufacturers liable if the product is more 
dangerous than the average consumer contemplates.246 The Barker court rejected 
this standard, "refusing to permit the low esteem in which the public might hold a 
dangerous product to diminish the manufacturer's responsibility for injuries caused 
by that product,"247 It adopted instead a two-prong test incorporating warranty 
standards in the form of consumer expectations and cost-benefit standards in the 
form of risk-utility.248 The court treated the frrst prong as a strict liability standard 
that is prospective in nature.249 It viewed that test, however, as insufficient by 
itself for determining when a defect exists because consumers might not know 
how safe the product might be.2S0 The court concluded, therefore, that even if the 
product satisfies ordinary consumer expectations, the jury in hindsight can apply 
the risk-utility test and fmd that the risk of danger outweighs the benefits of design 
and subject the manufacturer to liability.2S1 Thus, the court chose a policy 
containing both an absolute standard and a balancing standard for determining 
liability. This too is a value choice. 
Every time the court chooses to use a cost-benefit analysis and rejects 
another standard, it is, in effect, rejecting the policy choice implicit in the alter-
native standard and adopting the policy choice embodied in the particular cost-
benefit analysis it decides to apply. The converse of this is also true. So, for ex-
ample, Judge Posner's policy choice in Duckworth is to make it more difficult for 
prisoners to maintain a cause of action against prison officials whose actions injure 
them and thus tends to immunize such officials from suit.2S2 Judge Posner's 
decision in Llaguno encourages police officers, who fear there is not sufficient 
probable cause, to claim exigent circumstances and thereby by-pass magistrates 
245. See supra textaccompanying notes 161-88. 
246. Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consump-
tion, and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only from 
over-consumption •••. That is not what is meant by 'unreasonably dangerous' 
in this Section. The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that 
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with 
the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i. For a further discussion of the 
problems addressed by the Restatement, see supra text accompanying notes 176-88. 
247. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 425, 573 P.2d at 451, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233. 
248. [The court stated a] product is defective in design (1) if the plaintiff demonstrates 
that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when 
used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if the plaintiff proves that 
the product'S design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to prove, in 
light of the relevant factors discussed above, that on balance the benefits of the chal-
lenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design. 
[d. at 435,573 P.2d at 457-58, Cal. Rptr. at 239-40. 
The Barker court refers to the first prong of the test as reflecting the "warranty heritage 
upon which California product liability doctrine in part rests." [d. at 429-30, 573 P.2d at 454, 
143 Cal. Rptr. at 236. The court identified the second test as a risk benefit standard. [d. at 418, 
573 P.2d at 446, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 228. Factors to be considered include "the gravity of the dan-
ger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical 
feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse 
consequences to the product and to the consumer that would result from an alternative design." 
[d. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. 
249. [d. at 430,573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236. 
250. [d. 
251. [d. 
252. See supra text accompanying notes 210-19. 
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who, in our system of law, detennine whether police intrusion is warranted.2S3 
Judge Posner's opinion in American Hospitals narrows the discretionary powers 
of the federal district court judges with regard to preliminary injunctions and 
enlarges the power of the court of appeals to supervise their decision in that 
context.254 The Barker court's policy choice in rejecting theRestatement of Torts' 
unreasonably dangerous standard is to reject consumer awareness as the sole 
detenninant of what are pennissible levels of risk in products on the market.2Ss 
That same court, in adopting the two-prong test of consumer expectations and 
risk-utility, incorporates two separate policies: one that makes consumer 
awareness a floor but not a ceiling,2S6 and the other that avoids making 
manufacturers insurers of all harm proximately stemming from their design.2S7 
With respect to the latter policy, however, the court is also establishing a floor. 
The court is saying that the benefit of the design must be sufficiently great so as to 
off-set the risk to which it exposes society's members.2S8 
In the cases analyzed above, the courts are choosing between a policy that 
incorporates a cost-benefit analysis in its application and some other policy. In 
order to highlight that the application of cost-benefit analysis must involve some 
policy choice beyond the decision to reach a conclusion through cost-benefit 
reasoning, we now examine a case in which the results of a specific cost-benefit 
analysis can support two different policy choices. Depending on which policy is 
adopted, the same cost-benefit reasoning yields opposite legal conclusions. While 
both policies seek to promote the specific efficiency consideration, each policy 
differs in how the damages for harm are allocated. 
In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Jadranska Slobodna 
Plovidba,2S9 a longshoreman fell to his death when he wandered into a darkened 
hold whose hatches were left open. The question facing the court was whether the 
shipowner should be held liable for the longshoreman's death given that it failed to 
take precautions to prevent the accident.260 To resolve the issue of the ship's duty, 
Judge Posner applied the Carroll Towing fonnula to weigh the costs to the ship of 
avoiding the accident against the risk of harm. Finding that the "expected harm" 
(i.e., the loss of life times the probability of it occurring261) was less than the 
burden.to the ship of accident prevention, Judge Posner found the ship not liable. 
253. See supra text accompany notes 220-34. 
254. See supra text accompanying notes 235-41. 
255. See supra text accompanying notes 242-58. 
256. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 425 n.7, 573 P.2d at 451 n.7,.143 Cal. Rptr. at 233 n.7. 
257. [d. at 432,573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238. 
258. See supra text accompanying note 247. . 
259. 683 F.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1982). 
260. Plovidba was a suit involving a longshoreman who had fallen to his death 
through an open hatch in a darkened hold. The ship on which one Patrick Huck was working as 
a longshoreman had five holds. Each hold had three decks with hatches that can be opened to 
the deck above or below; when all three hatches are open, cargo can be loaded into (or from) the 
lowest cargo area. After the longshoremen had completed work in the forward-most hold (hold 
1) and broken for lunch, the ship's crew came in, closed the top hatch and opened the lower 
two. This plunged the hold into darkness and created an opening with a drop of about twenty-
five feet. The ship's decision to do so was to facilitate loading at the next port of call. That 
afternoon, the longshoremen's crew worked in the adjacent hold. Sometime late afternoon, 
Huck returned to hold I, now in darkness and fell to his death through the open hatch. The jury 
found that the shipowner had not been negligent but Huck and his employer, the stevedore com-
pany, had. The plaintiffs appealed. Plovidba, 683 F.2d at 1023-24. 
261. See supra note 156. 
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Assuming that Judge Posner's calculations regarding the value of human 
life and his assessment of an extremely low probability of such an accident 
occurring comport with generally acceptable standards,262 then his cost-benefit 
analysis clearly indicates that the probability of an accident was just too low to 
warrant the cost of the preventative measures. Under this value assessment, the 
ship's course of action was the efficient choice to make. However, this does not 
preclude the shipowner from paying for the accident. 
Society clearly accepts that some accident prevention measures are so costly 
to undertake, given the low probability of harm, that it would not be in society's 
interest to force enterprises to undertake such precautions. Obvious extreme 
examples include forcing companies not to release miracle drugs because of low 
level risks of harm, not to fly airplanes because of the risk of crashes, and not to 
build homes out of wood because of the risk of fIre. Preventative measures are 
insisted upon when situations are viewed as "just too dangerous" relative to the 
costs of the alternatives.263 Cost-benefit analysis merely provides guidelines for 
society to use in making its determinations as to when that line of danger has been 
crossed. 
The implication Judge Posner draws from assigning liability according to 
the Carroll Towing formula is that efficiency requires that the shipowner pay only 
for harms generated by inefficient activity. This is not correct. Not requiring 
corporations to undertake every conceivable costly prevention is not synonymous 
with leaving the victims to absorb the full costs of such accidents when they do 
occur. Though it is in society's interest that corporations only undertake levels of 
prevention that society deems efficient, allowing the corporation to be liability-free 
if it behaves efficiently is not the only means to accomplish that goal. An example 
of an alternative policy that also promotes economically efficient levels of 
precaution, is one that assigns liability to the party who could have avoided the 
accident at the least cost.264 
In P lovidba, for example, the ship could have avoided the accident if it had 
closed the intermediate hatches or posted warning signs and locked the doors to the 
darkened hold.26s Even though the cost to the ship of these actions are minimal,266 
Judge Posner concludes that the expected harm from not undertaking the 
precautions was even less. It was appropriate, then, on that basis, for the ship not 
to undertake them. The question is whether the Carroll Towing rule of holding the 
ship not liable in this case is necessary to encourage the ship to take this course of 
(in)action. In other words, would the ship have made the same efficient decision 
if, instead, it were held liable as it would be under the least-cost accident avoider 
approach, or would it have felt compelled, due to the liability assignment, to 
undertake an inefficient, excessive level of precaution? The answer is, in fact, that 
the ship would have made the same efficient decision whether or not it was 
assigned the liability for the longshoreman's accident. 
262. For a criticism of his analysis see infra notes 287 -3m and accompanying text. 
263. See supra text accompanying notes 161-88. 
264. For descriptions of the least-cost accident avoider approach, see G. CALABRESI, 
supra note 26, at 35-129; Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 
CALIF. L. REv. 677, 688-93 (1985); ShavelI, supra note 26, at 1,2-3, 6-8. 
265. Plovidba, 683" F. 2d at 1027. 
, 266. "[W]e judge [these costs] in this case to have been, at most, moderate, and pos-
sibly small." [d. 
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This can be seen by recognizing that the ship makes its own calculations to 
as.certain the optimal course for it to take. When it is liable for the harm, its 
expected cost from inaction equals the value of the expected hann.267 On the other 
hand, it can avoid that cost by undertaking another cost, the cost of preventative 
measures. It makes the decision whether or not to undertake accident prevention 
activities by weighing the cost of prevention against the expected cost of hann.268 
If the Carroll Towing fonnuIa holds, then the ship is liable for the hann only 
when the burden of avoiding an accid~nt is less than the expected harm and the 
ship takes no precautions. Thus, in those situations in which the burden is less 
than the expected harm, the ship will choose to undertake accident avoidance 
because it is cheaper for the ship to do so than pay for the expected harm. From 
society's point of view, this is the efficient course of action. If the burden exceeds 
the expected hann, then under Carroll Towing the ship will not be liable for any 
accident regardless of its actions. Since zero liability is less than the cost of 
accident prevention, the ship will choose to take no action. In this instance, since 
the burden exceeds the expected cost, the ship has taken the efficient course. 
Thus, we can see that under the Carroll Towing liability assignment, the ship is 
encouraged to make efficient decisions with regard to accident prevention activity. 
Does the ship's course of action change under the least-cost accident avqider 
approach? Assuming that the shipowner is the least-co~t accident avoider, then 
under that rule, the shipowner is liable no matter what course of action it takes. 
Will it make the same efficient choices as under the Carroll Towing liability rule? 
Since, under the least-cost accident liability assignment, the ship must pay for the 
expected harm under every circumstance, it is really facing only one decision: 
should it undertake the burden of avoiding the accident or should it decide to pay 
the cost of the expected harm. Clearly, its decision depends upon which is 
cheaper. If the burden is less than the expected cost, it will choose to undertake 
the burden. If the burden is greater than the expected cost, it will choose to pay the 
expected cost of the harm and not undertake the burden. This proves to be exactly 
the same (efficient) course of action as the ship chose under the Carroll Towing 
formula: the ship undertakes accident prevention only when its costs are less than 
the expected hann. The only difference lies in who pays for the accident when the 
efficient course dictates not to undertake the burden of prevention. Under the 
least-cost accident-avoider approach, it is the ship who pays for the accident. 
Under the Carroll Towing formulation, the victim pays. 
Thus, it is apparent that even the decision to encourage efficient behavior 
according to a cost-benefit analysis does not alleviate the need for making value 
choices. As has been demonstrated, the same efficient behavior dictated by a cost-
benefit analysis can be a dimension of different policy choices. In the example of 
Plovidba, the choice to be made is who will pay for accidental hanns, even when 
everyone behaves efficiently. The decision represents a value choice and the 
Carroll Towing formula embodies only one of them. 
267. If L is the liability if the accident occurs and P is the probability it will occur, then 
the expected hann.is PL (see supra note 156). Though when an accident occurs, the firm will 
have to pay L, an accident will not occur every trip. Accidents will occur P percent of the time. 
Thus, when averaged out, the firm's expected cost each trip is PL. 
268. Whereas the firm's expected cost to pay for harm is PL (see supra note 266), the 
firm's costs to prevent such accidents, B, is incurred every trip. It is this cost that the firm must 
weigh against the expected cost of harm to determine whether it should undertake preventative 
efforts. 
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VII. SUBSTITUTION OF V ALUE CHOICES 
A. The Ford Pinto Case and Judicial Angst 
[32:1 
When courts adopt cost-benefit analysis for certain kinds of issues like 
product design, they are implicitly recognizing the need to accept the notion that 
society must be exposed to some level of risk of harm if it is to enjoy the benefits 
of modem technology. Sometimes, however, the courts are repelled by the actual 
results in particular cases. There are instances in which the courts punish those 
who adopt the very criteria by which the courts decree the litigants' behavior will 
be judged. 
The judicial angst created" by such conflicting views is observable in 
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. (the Pinto case}.269 In that case, the plaintiff sued 
Ford Motor Company for injuries he sustained when the Ford Pinto in which he 
was a guest exploded. The explosion occured when another car rearended the 
Pinto and ruptured the Pinto's gas tank.270 Plaintiff claimed that the defendant's 
car was defectively designed with respect to the placement of the gas tank, and was 
awarded punitive damages.271 The court held that the defendant's decision to 
engage in a prospective cost-benefit analysis for determining whether or not to 
269. 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981). 
270. The owner of the car, Lilly Gmy, and her guest Richard Grimshaw, were in her 
1972 Ford Pinto on a California freeway. The car suddenly stalled and came to a halt in the 
middle lane. The driver of a 1962 Ford Galaxie was unable to stop and hit the rear of Mrs. 
Gmy's car. The Ford Galaxie was traveling at between 28 and 37 miles per hour when it hit the 
Pinto. The Pinto caught fire upon impact The Galaxie had pushed the Pinto gas tank forward 
and caused it to be punctured by the flange or one of the bolts on the differential housing. Fuel 
spmyed from the punctured tank and entered the passenger compartment By the time the car 
came to a rest, both Gmy and Grimshaw had been seriously burned. Gmy died a few days later; 
Grimshaw survived but suffered permanent serious and disfiguring injuries. [d. at 773-74, 174 
Cal. Rptr. at 359. 
271. Testimony presented at trial included the results of cmsh tests Ford itself had 
conducted. These showed that the Pinto did not meet the proposed federal regulation requiring 
all automobiles manufactured in 1972 to be able to withstand a 20-mile per hour fixed barrier 
without significant fuel spillage. [d. at 774-75, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 360. Mechanical prototypes, 
when struck from the rear with a barrier moving at twenty-one miles an hour suffered damage 
very much like that incurred by the Gmy's car. The gas tank was moved forward and punc-
tured, causing fuel leakage in excess of federal standards. [d. 
The plaintiffs at trial also introduced evidence that technological changes to the Pinto de-
sign were possible which would have significantly altered the car's ability to survive a cmsh 
without fuel leakage. A Pinto with two longitudinal "hat sections" (reinforcing longitudinal side 
members) passed a 20 mile-per-hour rear impact fixed barrier test without fuel leakage. Vehicles 
with fuel tanks installed above rather than behind the differential passed rear cmsh tests into 
fixed barriers at 31 miles-per-hour, while the Pinto as built could not pass such a test at 21 
miles-per-hour. [d. A former Ford engineer and executive in charge of cmsh testing testified 
that Ford's management knew of the fuel system's vulnerability and of the possible changes 
which might increase its safety. Documentary evidence corrobomted the engineer's testimony. 
[d. at 775-78, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 361-62. 
The jury awarded Grimshaw $2,516,000 compensatory damages and $125 million puni-
tive damages; Gmy's heirs, who sued for wrongful death, received $559,680 in compensatory 
damages. On Ford's motion for a new trial, Grimshaw was required to remit all but $3.5 mil· 
lion of the punitive award as the court's condition for denying Ford's motion. [d. at 771·72, 
174 Cal. Rptr. at 358. 
Ford appealed from the judgment and from an order denying its motion for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict as to punitive damages. Grimshaw appealed from the order granting 
a conditional new trial and from the order amending his award of punitive damages. Gmy's 
heirs cross-appealed from the judgment and from an order denying leave to amend their com· 
plaint to seek punitive damages. [d. at 772, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358·59. 
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install a safety feature constituted malice sufficient to uphold an award of punitive 
damages.272 The court's decision in this regard is problematic and raises 
fundamental questions about the consistency with which courts wish to adopt a 
risk-utility analysis for determining manufacturers' liability. 
The court was obviously perturbed, if not repelled, by the specter of cor-
porate executives deciding to take calculated risks of harm on the basis of the cost 
of avoiding harm relative to the benefits.273 The court's·view ofFord's behavior is 
reminiscent of the older standard of negligence requiring parties to avoid accidents 
at all costs. It is almost as if the court at some level refused to accept the full 
implications of its abandonment of unavoidable accident judgments and its 
adoption of risk-utility analysis in this area. 
This schizophrenic view cannot be justified (as the Grimshaw court may 
have thought) by the fact that risk-utility analysis used in the courts usually in-
volves retrospective determinations of unintended risk of harm, whereas in the 
Pinto case, Ford Motor engaged in prospective intentional and knowing acceptance 
of an actual risk of harm. Courts use risk-utility analysis to determine what 
constitutes a socially acceptable level of risk; a distinction in the use of such a 
standard between retrospective and prospective application is meaningless. The 
crucial factor is not at what point the decision about harm occurs but what level of 
harm society is going to tolerate.274 
Furthermore, the danger of, on the one hand, accepting risk-utility analysis 
as the standard for retrospective determination of liability but on the other hand 
penalizing those who use it prospectively, is to encourage purposeful corporate 
ignorance.275 While it is true that courts may attempt to deal with such a response 
272. [d. at 819-21,174 Cal. Rptr. at 388-89. In its appeal from the award of punitive 
damages, Ford argued that such awards were irilpennissible in product design cases. California 
law provided for an award of damages in civil cases only when the defendant had been gUilty of 
"oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied." [d. at 807,174 Cal. Rptr. at 380-81. The 
court noted, however, that California case law interpreted malice to include conduct evincing "a 
conscious disregard of the probability that the actor's conduct will result in injury to others." [d. 
at 808, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 381 (quoting Dawes v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 88, 168 
Cal. Rptr. 319, 322 (1980». Furthennore, the court found that there was sufficient evidence of 
such malice to justify the punitive damages. [d. at 812-14, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85. 
273. The court termed Ford's behavior ''reprehensible in the extreme." [d. at 819, 174 
Cal. Rptr. at 388. 
274. When the courts use risk-utility in strict liability design fault cases, the emphasis 
is on the product rather than the manufacturer's conduct Thus, the knowledge that he had, or 
should have had, when the design was first put in the market is theoretically immaterial. The 
product is judged in hindsight. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 434,573 P.2d at 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 
239; Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 Nl. 152,386 A.2d 816 (1978). Conversely, under 
a true strict liability theory, as opposed to negligence, a manufacturer who knew of the defect be-
fore putting a design on the market should not be judged more harshly than one whose knowl-
edge is only after-the-fact See supra text accompanying notes 161-88. 
275. While a legal incentive to improve product safety is present in a state of 
the art defense based upon feasibility, ... the incentive is not as strong as it 
could be. There is, to be sure, an impetus to incorporate safety devices which are 
feasible. There is not, however, an incentive to develop safety technology to a 
point at which it becomes feasible. Professor X ••• may not be inclined to de-
vote additional time and money, once the airbag is developed, for the purpose of 
making it economically feasible. Since further refmement by manufacturer Y 
could deprive the firm of the benefit of the [state of the art] defense, it is not in 
the firm's best interest to.refine the airbag system. If neither the inventor nor the 
industry is inclined to do so, their inaction collectively sets the standards. 
Note, Product Liability Reform Proposals: The State of the Art Defense. 43 ALB. L. REV. 941, 
953 (1979). 
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by imputing malice to studied indifference,276 that remedy is likely to be 
unsuccessful. Because rmding the risk of harm will usually entail innovative de-
velopment for its discovery, there will be no bench mark of established procedure 
against which the courts can judge any particular corporation's failure to conduct 
investigations.277 Indeed such an approach might well have the effect of lowering 
the safety research goals of entire industries. 
If the decision on actionability is made on the basis of knowledge avail-
able at the time of trial, it obviously is made on the basis of hindsight ••.• 
The hindsight standard ••• provides a disincentive for the manufacturer 
to discover safety improvements for a product that has already been marketed. 
And, even if improvements are discovered, it discourages their utilization or dis-
closure and encourages their concealment in order to prevent liability for products 
already distributed. 
Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of /fnowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 734, 755 (1983). 
Hindsight analysis removes any element of culpability. Liability may be imposed 
even where no risk of harm was foreseeable at the time of manufacture. Indeed, 
hindsight analysis eliminates some incentive to discover such risks. Once discov-
ered, the knowledge of the risk may be used against the manufacturer to show the 
product is defective. 
Diamond, Eliminating the "Defect" in Design Strict Products Liability Theory, 34 HASTINGS L. 
J. 529, 543 (1982-83). 
276. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976) (''The substan-
tive justification for the rule [equating knowledge with conscious disregard of facts] is that delib-
erate ignorance and positive knowledge are equally culpable."). 
277. Putting aside the issue of what it would take to rebut the 'state of the art' 
presumption, there is yet another question which must be confronted. Why is 
there a presumption of any kind in favor of the defendant [manufacturer]? The 
self-evident answer is that once the state of the art has been met the defendant 
should be entitled to a presumption in his favor-he has, after all, conformed to 
existing technology. But. we forget in what posture the issue is raised. 
Invariably, the plaintiff has raised a design alternative which is both technologi-
cally and economically feasible at the time of trial. There are at least grounds for 
suspicion that the state of technology was not as limited as we might have 
thought •• '. The assumption is that scientific knowledge can be frozen and 
easily determined at any given point in time. That is sheer nonsense. The state 
of technical knowledge and technological feasibility is in a constant ebb and flow 
•••. To require a plaintiff who stands from the outside to cut through the maze 
of industry knowledge and identify technological feasibility at a particular point in 
time seems drastically unfair. . •• [T]he manufacturer who is best able to mar-
shall the evidence to support the proposition that it wl;iS not feasible should be 
made to carry the burden on this issue. It makes no sense whatsoever to throw 
on to the [plaintiff] the burden to prove ... that a presently feasible design could 
have been accomplished by industry if they had properly advanced the state of 
their knowledge. If the advance was not made, indUStry can best tell us of the 
faIse positives and blind alleys of their research (if in fact they performed the re-
search properly) which led them away from making the desired advance. 
Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Law-A Rush to Judgment, 
28 DRAKEL. REV. 221, 239-40 (1979). See also White, Economizing on the Sins of Our Past: 
Cleaning Up Our Hazardous Wastes, 25 Hous. L. REv. 899, 932-33 (1988), discussing 
advantages of proposal for liability framework which creates incentives for rums to police 
themselves by tax assessments to compensate victims: 
In cases of advanced technological innovations, the technical expertise necessary 
to grasp the implications of any particular safety measure is very high. Often the 
accused corporation is the only source for this assessment, and naturally its ex-
pressed opinion will be biased. By creating incentives for the industry to police 
itself, the question of the appropriateness of the degree of safety undertaken can 
be debated [in the court room] by experts on both sides of the issue. If the indus-
try as a whole feels that a particular firm is negligent, they will be able to present 
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Part of the court's repulsion in Grimshaw may have been caused by the 
small cost per car that would have to be expended to substantially reduce the risk 
of explosion - two dollars.278 Although this is an understandable emotional 
reaction, it tends to color the analysis of these issues. Although the cost of 
avoiding this particular harm was only two dollars per car, in the aggregate it 
represented over one hundred million dollars of certain expense to forestall the 
potential of exploding rear-ended gas tanks risking an estimated one hundred and 
eighty lives.279 
Though it might seem easy to argue that two dollars is an insignificant sum 
to ask consumers to pay for safety,280 it is important to remember that there are 
potentially hundreds of inexpensive equally significant safety measures that can be 
taken with each automobile prototype.281 The aggregate of these can easily add 
hundreds if not thousands of dollars to the cost of each car while avoiding risks 
that have little more than one in a million chance of occurring. Though it may 
seem callous to make such calculations on human lives, imposing the incorporation 
of such costs can put the price of an automobile beyond the reach of many people, 
thereby creating another loss to society that may be at least the same if not greater 
than the one that has been avoided. Certainly, social acceptance of the "inherently 
dangerous" automobile is quite evident Limitations on maximum speeds could be 
lowered for significant gains in highway safety and reduced fatalities.282 Better 
traction, steering and braking power enhances the driver's control over the vehicle 
evidence and arguments for the purposes of persuasion. The induslIy will have 
an incentive to do so since they most certainly would not want to pay higher tax 
rates [for victim compensation] in order to protect a negligent finn. 
278. The longitudinal reinforced members necessary for the car to pass the twenty 
mile-per-hour rear impact fixed barrier test cost $2.40; additional cross members to further 
strengthen the back end cost $1.80. Changes necessary to make the Pinto's gas tank safe in a 34 
to 38 mile-per-hour rear end collision by a vehicle the size of a Ford Galaxie would have cost 
$15.30 per car. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 775-76, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61. 
279. In making its cost-benefit analysis, Ford used the figures calculated by the 
National Highway Traffic and Safety Association to be the value of human life ($200,000) and 
serious burn injury ($67,000). Using an estimation of 180 burn deaths and 180 serious burn 
injuries per year, Ford calculated that the benefits that would be realized by adding safety devices 
to the Pinto's fuel tank, in terms of lives saved and injuries prevented, would equal approxi-
mately $50 million dollars, whereas the associated costs would be $137 million dollars. See S. 
Kinghorn, Corporate Harm-A Structural Analysis of the Criminogenic Elements of the 
Corporation 218 (1984) (unpublished dissertation). 
280. Though the court views the two dollar expense as coming out ofFord's corporate 
profits, in fact, as economics tells us, and as has been repeatedly verified empirically, any in-
creases in costs are ultimately passed on to the consumer. Even the legal circles understand and 
accept that fact, as is reflected in the courts' decision to impose strict liability on the grounds that 
manufacturers are better able to absorb the risks of harm by passing them on to consumers 
through higher prices. 
281. The evidence in Grimshaw indicates at least ten changes that could have been 
made to improve the fuel tank integrity. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 776,174 Cal. Rptr. at 
361. 
282. In April [1987], when Congress permitted all states to raise the speed 
limit on rural interstate highways to 65 m.p.h., 38 states chose to do so. 
'People are voting with their gas pedals,' says Gene Berthelsen of the 
California Department of Transportation ..•• 'We feel it's wiser to post speeds 
that people are already going.' 
The results thus far have been ominous. The National Highway Traffic 
Safety Association reports that in 22 of those states, highway deathS jumped 46% 
between May and July over the same three months in 1986 ...• 
Wilentz, Pulting the Pedal to the Metal, TIME, Jan. 11, 1988, at 29 (reported by Ted Gup). 
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but such features add substantially to the price of the car.283 Finally, studies have 
indicated that consumers themselves when faced with options in both safety and 
fashion details almost invariably choose conspicuous consumption over safety 
devices, reflecting their own internal cost-benefit analysis of putting their life and 
the lives of others at risk.284 
As the discussion above indicates, the Grimshaw case highlights the courts' 
need to come to grips with the full implications of cost-benefit analysis in judicial 
determinations. At the very least, consistent application of the standard is 
warranted. Consistency in the application of risk-utility analysis does not mean, 
however, that notions of fairness and minimal standards of safety cannot also be 
imposed. To accommodate these apparently conflicting needs, the courts should, 
in addition to risk-utility or any other cost-benefit analysis, use a separate standard 
that would operate as a threshold test to protect societal interests. In effect, the 
two-prong test of Lull v. Barker in the context of compensatory damages presages 
this movement by establishing consumer expectations as a floor of safety.285 If 
consumer expectations or other court-created standards are viewed as insufficient 
or inappropriate, the various federal regulatory guidelines for product and 
environmental safety can serve as the threshold standard.286 What is necessary is 
to avoid the court's inconsistent posture regarding risk-utility. 
B. The Longshoreman Case and Judicial Legerdemain 
The type of reasoning in Grimshaw tends to make the use of risk-utility 
analysis suspect. Since the court is assessing punitive damages for the application 
of a standard that it has itself adopted, it appears as if the court is rejecting 
cost-benefit analysis as being inherently evil.28'1 For different reasons, the results 
in Plovidba,288 also gives cost-benefit analysis a bad name. In Grimshaw, the 
283. Compare the ability of a Porsche to a mid-priced American automobile to avoid 
an accident (Of course, this ignores the temptation the Porsche offers the driver to undertake 
greater risks - which in itself reflects another cost-benefit analysis calculating the value of 
human life.). 
284. See, e.g., Malcolm, On the Road Again With a Passion, NEW YORK TIMES, 
Oct 10, 1988, at A10, col. 1. "Customers are looking for a lot of special things in new cars, 
but safety and gas mileage are not two of them." Interview with Chris Cedergen, an analyst 
with J.D. Powers & Associates. 
285. See supra notes 242-58 and accompanying text. 
286. In the two product catagories most frequently encountered in recent man-
ufacturers' design choice cases, Congress has .•• establish[ed] specialized 
administrative agencies and procedures for handling problems, including the 
establishment and enforcement of standards relating to product design •••• 
Moreover, ••• enactment of the Federal Consumer Product Safety Act, 
creating a[n] ••• administrative agency empowered to establish safety standards 
for a wide range of consumer products, strongly sugges,ts that the trend toward 
legislative and administrative standard-setting will continue. 
Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of 
Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1574-75 (1973). 
Who ••• should decide how much public risk we will accept and in what areas? 
The answer is painfully obvious ••• outside the legal community: expert admin-
istrative agencies, not lawyers. To make life safer, faster, we need not more 
scientists in the legal process but fewer lawyers in the scientific one. • .• Expert 
administrative agencies ••• [are] best able to regulate public risks in a manner 
calculated to advance the public health and welfare. 
Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 
COLUM. L. REv. 277, 329 (1985). 
287. See supra text accompanying notes 269-85. 
288. 683 F.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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court does not like the implications of corporate risk-utility decision-making and 
therefore adopted its own policy judgment to assuage its sense of outrage.289 In 
Plovidba, on the other hand, Judge Posner apparently did not like the policy 
judgment of Congress and by using the Carroll Towing fonnula he was able to 
substitute his own policy judgment in place of theirs.290 It is not, however, the 
cost-benefit analysis itself that accomplishes this replacement, it is Judge Posner's 
particular handling of the mathematical variables in the fonnula that obfuscates the 
substantive issues, thereby facilitating the substitution of policy choices. 
The significance of hidden value choices is made even more acute when we 
examine the implications of Judge Posner's choice of the Learned Hand fonnula in 
light of the express legislative intent behind the changes in the applicable law in 
Plovidba. The law with regard to the shipowner's liability for injuries sustained 
by longshoremen is regulated by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation ACt.291 In 1972, Congress amended the statute thereby changing 
the shipowner's third party liability to the longshoreman from one of strict liability 
to one based on negligence.292 While doing so Congress also made clear (as the 
House and Senate Reports293 expressly state, the Supreme Court confrrms294 and 
Judge Posner did indeed acknowledge,) that the now applicable standard of 
negligence is not to be construed to pennit arguments of assumption of risk or 
contributory negligence to bar a longshoreman's recovery.29S In spite of the 
Congressional mandate, Judge Posner's application of the Carroll Towing fonnula 
to the facts in Plovidba incorporates those very elements with which contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk are concerned in order to reach a judgment that 
does, in fact, relieve the shipowner of liability •. 
The shipowner was being sued for failing to take measures that would have 
prevented the longshoreman's death. Articulating a new basis for evaluating 
negligence fmdings, Judge Posner applied the Carroll Towing fonnula to assess 
the rationality of a jury's fmding that the ship's inaction did not constituted 
negligence.296 This required weighing the cost to the ship of taking preventative 
measures against the value of the harm multiplied by the probability of the hann 
occurring (i.e., the expected harm).297 As noted earlier, the burden to the ship of 
avoiding the accident was very small; it entailed either closing the darkened hold's 
289. See supra text accompanying notes 269-85. 
290. See infra text accompanying notes 290-306. 
291. 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1982). 
292. Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576 §§ 1 et. seq., 86 Stat. 1263, amend-
ing 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et. seq. (1970) (codified as modified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et. seq. 
(1982». 
293. The Report of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee said that the admi-
ralty concept of comparative negligence, not the common law rule of contributory negligence 
would apply. Furthermore, the defense of assumption of risk was precluded. S. Rep. No. 
1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1972). See also H. Rep. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 
(1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 4698, 4705. 
294. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the shipowner may not defend on the 
ground that Santos should have refused to continue working in face of an obviously 
dangerous winch which his employer, Seattle, was continuing to use. The District Court 
erred in ruling otherwise, since the defense of assumption of risk is unavailable in 905(b) 
litigation. 
Scindia Steam Nav. Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 176 n.22 (1981). 
295. Plovidba, 683 F.2d at 1028. 
296. [d. at 1028-29. 
297. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying texl 
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intennediate hatches or locking its doorways and putting up warning signs.298 The 
decision not to take the precautionary actions created the risk of serious injury and 
loss of life, thereby placing a very high value on the harm. Since the cost to the 
ship of avoiding the harm was very small and the cost of the harm was extremely 
high, the shipowner's liability for the longshoreman's death hinged on the court's 
assessment of the probability of the accident occurring. 
The reason Judge Posner gave for upholding the jury verdict relieving the 
shipowner of liability was his rmding, under the facts before him, that the 
probability of accidental loss of life was extremely smal1.299 The probability was so 
small, Judge Posner argued, that it offset the high value of the harm to such an 
extent that when the two were multiplied together, the combination was less than 
the costs to the shipowner of putting in the safeguards, even though the value of 
the lost life alone greatly exceeded those costs.:lOO 
When we examine how Judge Posner reached his conclusion we see that he, 
in effect, used those very elements that Congress expressly forbade in detennining 
third party negligence in this area. Judge Posner's primary argument was that the 
probability that a longshoreman would go into an adjacent darkened hold and fall 
through an open hatch was very small.301 To support that conclusion, Judge 
Posner posited that the deceased longshoreman was probably stealing,302 that he 
was forew~ed of danger by the darkness itself, and that he probably knew of the 
open hatch since he must have skirted around it to be found on the hatch's far 
side,303 By attaching a low probability to the longshoreman deciding to be 
dishonest and reckless, as well as a low probability to his failing to successfully 
skirt the open hatchway, Judge Posner felt able to conclude that it was a low 
probability event that the longshoreman would fall into the hatch itself.304 
Each of the factors Judge Posner used included elements of assumption of 
risk and contributory negligence. The whole purpose of prohibiting assumption of 
risk and contributory negligence as a bar to recovery is to prevent the shipowner 
from using the longshoreman's decisions and behavior in these matters to relieve 
the shipowner from liability for its own (in)action. It is true that Judge Posner was 
not using contributory negligence and assumption of risk directly to bar recovery 
- but by incorporating those actions of the longshoreman that constituted 
contributory negligence into the probability fonnula, he achieved the same ends 
indirectly. While using the Learned Hand fonnula would not necessarily yield this 
same result in every case, it does - as the court applies it - in Plovidba. In 
Plovidba, the burden of avoiding the harm was so small and the harm itself was so 
great that the decisive variable was the probability of harm. Judge Posner's focus 
298. See supra note 264 and accompanying text 
299. Providba, 683 F.2d at 1028. 
300. [d. at 1027-28. For a discussion on how the probability interacts with the loss of 
life in the Learned Hand fonnula, see the discussion in note 215, supra, on probability and 
multiplication. 
301. Providba, 683 F.2d at 1028. 
302. [d. Crates of liquor were stored in hold 1 and it was conjectured that Huck was 
planning to steal some on his way off the ship. [d. at 1024. 
303. [d. at 1028. Huck's body was found about forty feet from the hatchway from 
which he entered. The open hatch in the deck began six to ten feet from the hatchway and was 
roughly thirty feet across. Thus, one could conclude that Huck had successfully skirted the 
hatch and fallen in from the far side. [d. at 1024. 
304. [d. at 1028. 
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on the plaintiff's behavior alone to evaluate that probability was detenninative in 
barring recovery.30S 
Nonetheless, even in Plovidba, a proper evaluation of the probability of 
hann for the Carroll Towing fonnula would have reached a different result. Judge 
Posner looked only to the probability of the particular acts of the particular 
longshoreman. Proper use of the Carroll Towing fonnula requires an assessment 
of a risk of fall into a darkened open hatchway based on the probability of what 
any longshoreman might do (or indeed what anyone else on the ship might do) for 
any reason. The fonnula measures the risk (i.e., the probability) that if a darkened 
hold's hatch floors are left open that someone, anyone, might wander in and fall to 
their injury or death. It does not measure the probability of a specific reason being 
the cause of that wandering. In other words, the greater the number of individuals 
on board, the greater the likelihood that someone will wander into the darkened 
hold and fall in. Under that more appropriate evaluation, the probability surely 
would have been large enough so that the expected harm would outweigh the 
burden of avoiding harm. This is particularly likely to be the case in P lovidba, 
since avoiding the harm was nearly costless. Thus, based on the Carroll Towing 
criterion that Judge Posner elected to judge the jury f'mdings by, Judge Posner 
should have found no rationall?asis for the jury verdict. 306 
Finally, the settled case law appears to be that it is "negligence for the vessel 
to leave cargo hatches unguarded on a working deck if the particular hatch was not 
to be worked."307 Indeed one may well ask why in the face of such case law 
making shipowners who leave hatches open and unguarded liable for the 
consequences, Judge Posner reopened the question by employing the weighing 
and balancing of the Carroll Towing fonnula. 
Is the attraction of the Learned Hand fonnula in P lovidba because math-
ematical variables tend to obscure the value choices that are being incorporated 
indirectly? It seems clear Judge Posner thinks that contributory negligence and 
assumption of risk are proper defenses in § 905(b) cases. The difficulty, of 
course, is that Congress thinks otherwise. An overt ruling contrary to congres-
sional intent is out of the question. What is apparently not out of the question is a 
ruling that has the same effect Congress specifically prohibited. Judge Posner's 
application of the Learned Hand fonnula neatly facilitates this result. It is, 
however, unfair to blame the fonnula. 
305. Posner's conclusions that a low P offsets the liability arising from a low B are at 
variance with those of other courts. For example, the court in Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 
514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974) reached the opposite conclusion when both a low cost accident avoid-
ance technique and a low probability of the accident occurring were present in the case: 
Although the incidence of glaucoma in the age range of the plaintiff is ap-
proximately one in 25,000, this alone should not be enough to deny her a claim. 
Where its presence can be detected by a simple, well-known harmless test, where 
the results of the test are definitive, where the disease can be successfully arrested 
by early detection and where its effects are irreversible if undetected over a sub-
stantial period of time, liability should be imposed upon the defendants •••• 
[d. at 522,519 P.2d at 985. 
306. One of the issues Judge Posner addressed was "the plaintiffs challenge to the 
jury instructions and its contention that negligence was shown as a matter of law." Plovidba, 
683 F.2d at 1026. Ironically, if Judge Posner had included all the correct variables in assessing 
the probability of harm in his application of the Learned Hand formula, he could have easily 
found the shipowner negligent as a matter oflaw. 
307. Johnson v. AS Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334, 342 (1st Cir. 1980). 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
As we have seen, the growing and widespread use of cost-benefit reasoning 
in the courts is an outgrowth of the origins of negligence law. Desiring to find 
ways to circumscribe the scope of liability that the courts themselves were 
expanding, judges have turned to a weighing and balancing approach to find the 
appropriate delimiters. Coupled with the analysis of economic and legal scholars, 
the more generalized weighing and balancing has given way, in modern times, to a 
more formal and somewhat restrictive framework of cost-benefit reasoning. Some 
jurists have become enamored with its power; others are disgusted with its results, 
which are purported to be "objective." In some areas of liability law, the courts are 
increasingly depending on cost-benefit analysis as the ultimate arbiter of their 
standards. New areas of law are being introduced to cost-benefit analysis as it is 
being applied in entirely novel contexts. With this advent comes the necessity of 
greater comprehension and refmement of the cost-benefit technique. The first 
order of business in that direction is to draw the distinction between cost-benefit 
reasoning and social value decision-making. This Article demonstrates a variety of 
ways that social decisions arise in the context of applying cost-benefit analysis to 
legal frameworks. Understanding the full scope and ramifications of this approach, 
however, is really just beginning. As the use of the cost-benefit test expands, the 
necessity of inquiry into its nature will expand as well. 
